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Tax Neutrality and Tax Amenities 
David Hasen* 
Abstract 
Neutrality has been a dominant theme in scholarly and policy debates 
on international taxation for fifty years.  This paper questions whether the 
concept of tax neutrality is adequately specified for analyzing the efficiency 
properties of international tax systems.  As distinct from the closed economy 
setting, in the open economy setting, tax incentive effects include the 
redirection of both capital and tax revenues from one jurisdiction to another.  
Because tax revenues finance infrastructure and other productivity-enhancing 
goods – so-called “tax amenities” – and because capital burdens infrastructure, 
one consequence of the reallocation of tax revenues and assets is the 
adjustment of non-tax-affected rates of return in both home and host 
jurisdictions.  As a result, what are viewed as tax incentive effects, or 
distortions, improve productivity in some cases.  Neutrality as a value, 
however, rests on the idea that tax incentive effects reduce efficiency by 
causing resources to be allocated away from some optimum non-tax-affected 
baseline; this idea is what justifies referring to tax-influenced allocations as 
distortions.  The implication of the argument is that the baseline is normatively 
arbitrary in the open-economy setting. 
The paper suggests that in light of these considerations, an analysis 
focusing on the allocative, distributive and competitive properties of 
international tax rules would be more helpful than one focused on their 
neutrality properties.  In this spirit, a simple model relating tax revenue and 
population to productivity is offered. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907076
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Introduction 
In the economic analysis of international taxation, few policy goals 
loom larger than the promotion of tax neutrality, or the idea that tax 
considerations should not drive the economic decisions of private actors 
 2 
engaged, or potentially engaged, in cross-border activity.1  Talk of neutrality 
animates official policy discourse,2 while scholarly literature on the subject has 
become something of a cottage industry.3  Many papers are devoted to 
promoting a particular conception of neutrality over one or more rival 
conceptions;4 others develop or test various empirical claims about neutrality.5  
It is safe to say that the disagreements are substantive and the debates robust.6 
Operating as part of background consensus are the assumptions that 
international tax neutrality is a well-defined concept and an ideal the pursuit of 
which, when properly conceived, is normatively appropriate.  This paper 
argues that the assumptions are incorrect.  The public finance model in which 
the concept of tax neutrality originally was developed applies to the closed 
economy setting.  In that setting, it is possible to formulate the concept of a 
non-tax-affected world with sufficient rigor to specify a baseline of non-tax-
distorted economic activity.  The baseline, in turn, serves as the yardstick by 
which one can measure the distorting effects of taxes.  As explained below, a 
centerpiece of the framework is the assumption that one may take levels of tax-
financed infrastructure and other goods that contribute to productivity – “tax 
amenities,” as I refer to them – as exogenously given. 
In contrast to the domestic setting, in a system of open economies, the 
problem of non-neutrality arises because any system of rules for taxing cross-
border arrangements induces flows of capital, labor or both across national 
boundaries and affects patterns of ownership as well.7  It is well understood 
that these responses affect the productivity both of the assets that are somehow 
shifted in reaction to the rules and of all factors of production to the extent the 
relative supply of and demand for them are shifted through the first effect.  But 
                                                
1 Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, __, at [draft at 
p. 1]. 
2 See, e.g., Testimony of R. Glenn Hubbard before U.S. House Subcommittee 
on Select Revenue Measures, June 22, 2006. 
3 A Westlaw search returned 212 results for articles in law journals having the 
terms “international” and “tax neutrality” in the same sentence.  A JSTOR search of the 
same terms in economics journals returned 100 results. 
4 E.g., Desai & Hines, Old Rules and New Realities, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 937 
(2004). 
5 See, e.g., id., at 946-50 (citing studies). 
6 [CITE.] 
7 See Hines, Reconsidering, for a statement of the basic neutrality problem. 
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these responses have a third effect as well.  They alter the quantity of tax 
revenue in every jurisdiction that is a part of the system.  Because of the 
relationship, over the long term, between tax revenues and the supply of tax 
amenities, tax incentives circle back to affect both the pre-tax and the after-tax 
rates of return that function as baselines to start with, thereby upending their 
status as baselines. 
Several conclusions would appear to follow.  First, it is not clear that 
the concepts of tax neutrality and tax distortion in the international setting are 
meaningful.  If it is impossible to articulate a neutral baseline, it would seem 
impossible to justify normative claims about the value of minimizing actual 
departures, that is, “distortions,” from whatever is taken as the baseline.  
Second, any effort to model the impact of tax rules on capital flows or 
ownership patterns must account for the relationship between the provision of 
tax-financed amenities and the productive capacity of labor and capital.  
(Similar problems would apply to the analysis of tax-induced individual 
migration, but, following most of the literature,8 I assume that individual 
migration is much less sensitive to tax rules, and I therefore disregard it.)  It is 
not sufficient to account merely for the effects of tax rules on the supply of and 
demand for either capital or its owners, taking pre-tax rates of return as given.  
And third, it seems that a more useful mode of analysis would dispense with 
considerations of neutrality in favor of a focus on other significant properties of 
tax regimes, informed by an idea of how tax revenues affect productivity. 
The paper develops these points as follows.  Part I sets up the analysis 
by describing the traditional framing of the problem of tax distortions in cross-
border investment.  Part II describes the basic model of tax neutrality as 
developed in the closed economy setting and as it has been applied in the 
international setting.  Part III offers criticisms of the application of the model to 
the evaluation of the basic methods of double tax relief – worldwide taxation 
and territorial taxation.  Part IV defends the view that a productive framework 
for analysis would eschew neutrality considerations and take its bearings 
instead from the allocative, distributional and competitive properties of systems 
for taxing cross-border income. 
                                                
8 See e.g., Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 493 (2007) (noting that few Americans change residence in 
response to tax rates).  To the extent labor location is sensitive to taxes, the effects 
analyzed in this paper would be compounded.  See Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and 
Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1540 (2009) for an extension of neutrality 
analysis to labor as a tax-sensitive factor of production. 
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I. The Problem of International Double Taxation 
Tax non-neutrality in the international setting arises from the fact that 
at least two jurisdictions plausibly have a claim to tax income earned from 
cross-border arrangements: the jurisdiction of the place of investment (the 
“source” or “host”) and the jurisdiction where its owner resides (the 
“residence” or “home”).  By contrast, in the domestic setting there is generally 
only one plausible candidate to asses tax, as source and residence (host and 
home) are identical. 
States, recognizing the magnitude of the bias toward domestic 
investment that would result if both home and host exercised their full 
prerogative to tax, have regularly sought to alleviate the high tax burden that 
otherwise would fall on cross-border income.9  The general solution has been 
for residence states to cede all or a portion of their taxing power, whether by 
treaty, unilateral action, or combination of the two, so that the total rate faced 
by a taxpayer in the cross-border setting approximates the rate of one of the 
two states involved.10  Where the effort is successful, exactly one tax (or an 
amount of tax exactly equal to the tax imposed by one of the states on its 
residents’ domestic income) applies to all income whether earned domestically 
or abroad.  So-called “double taxation” is eliminated. 
The widely recognized difficulty with these solutions is that they 
address only partially the problem of non-neutrality, which persists because: (a) 
the location of capital, the location of its owners and, in more recent treatments, 
the identity of its owners all are somewhat elastic, (b) different jurisdictions 
impose different rates of tax, and (c) different jurisdictions adopt different 
methods of double tax relief.11  In particular, because capital or its owner may 
seek the lowest possible tax, locational or ownership decisions continue to be 
driven by tax considerations, even though one or the other of the location or 
ownership decisions may be tax-neutral.  The question then becomes which 
type of neutrality is least distorting, over all.12 
                                                
9 [CITE.] 
10 See generally Adam Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, __ 
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. __ (2010). 
11 Michael Graetz , The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Taxing International 
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 
TAX L. REV. 261, 272 n.36 (2001). 
12 See Desai & Hines, at 955-75, for an example of this type of analysis. 
 5 
A. The Basic Problem 
To illustrate these points, consider the following three-stage analysis as 
applied to a simple system consisting of two states, State A and State B, in 
which a resident of State A has $100 to invest.  Assume in the first stage that 
no taxes apply.  If the State A resident has an investment opportunity that is 
expected to yield 9 percent if made in State A, but 10 percent if made in State 
B, the economically efficient decision is for the resident to make the 
investment in State B.  Because no taxes apply, the State A resident realizes 
$10 of income after one year, and total wealth has concomitantly increased by 
$10.  (In a dynamic model, investors from both states would continue to favor 
investment in State B until the after-tax return there converged with the after-
tax return in State A, but for present purposes it is sufficient to use a static 
model.)13 
Now, in the second stage, assume the same situation except that State 
A adopts a 35 percent rate of tax for all the income of its residents as well as 
for income produced domestically by non-residents, and State B adopts a 25 
percent rate on an analogous basis.  In the absence of any relief for double 
taxation, a resident of either state will face a tax rate at the level imposed solely 
by its residence for purely domestic investments, but a rate equal to the sum of 
the two states’ rates, or 60 percent, for cross-border investments.  (It is possible 
that a state would treat foreign taxes paid as a deductible business expense, but 
deductibility would merely alleviate the disparity between domestic and cross-
border investment, not eliminate it.  For the sake of simplicity, I omit 
discussion of the deduction model here.)  Accordingly, even though the pretax 
yield and therefore total wealth is greater if the State A resident makes the 
investment in State B, the State A resident will make it domestically, because 
the after-tax yield there is greater: 5.85 percent versus 4 percent.14  Without 
relief from double taxation, after one year, $9 of total wealth will be produced 
instead of $10, meaning that $1 of “deadweight loss” arises in the system.  
Again, although it can be expected that after-tax rates of return will equalize 
over time as capital investment responds to tax rates, the resulting allocations 
of capital and labor will be inefficient when compared with the allocations that 
would result in the absence of taxes, taking as a given in the latter case that tax 
revenues would be provided for in some fashion.15 
                                                
13 See, e.g., Fadi Shaheen, __. 
14 5.85 percent is 9 percent reduced by 35 percent, and 4 percent is 10 percent 
reduced by 60 percent. 
15 See, e.g., Knoll, at __. 
 6 
As described above, the general solution to this problem is to eliminate 
one level of tax or an amount of tax equal to that imposed by one of the states.  
Thus, consider, in a third stage, two common alternative methods for achieving 
a single rate of tax: providing residents a credit against their domestic tax 
liability for foreign income taxes paid (a “foreign tax credit,” or “FTC”), and 
exempting residents’ foreign-source income, loss and expense from tax.  Under 
either method, the problem of non-neutrality is alleviated but not eliminated.  
More generally, under any solution to the problem of double taxation where 
rates differ across jurisdictions, non-neutrality arises across some margin of 
possible taxpayer behavior. 
1. First Variation: Worldwide Taxation with an Unlimited FTC 
To see how tax distortion persists, assume in the first variation that 
both states tax the income earned in the source but that residence states provide 
an unlimited FTC to their residents for income foreign taxes paid.  This model 
is generally referred to as residency-based, worldwide taxation.16  Under the 
residency-based model, foreign taxes paid by the state’s residents reduce 
domestic tax liability on a dollar-for-dollar basis.  Further, since, in the base 
case, the credit is “unlimited,” the resident’s tax rate is fixed regardless of the 
rate in the source, because the resident state will reimburse its resident any 
excess of foreign taxes paid over domestic taxes due.  Such an excess arises 
when the average tax rate in the source jurisdiction exceeds the average rate in 
the residence jurisdiction. 
In this setting, the problem of double taxation is eliminated in the 
sense that each individual pays the same, domestic rate of tax regardless of 
where the investment is made.  Moreover, taking the location of the resident 
and the identities of the owners of capital as fixed, tax neutrality is preserved, 
because the FTC regime eliminates the only remaining tax-based incentive, 
which is to adjust the location of the investment in response to taxes.  That is, 
the resident of State A will face a 35 percent rate of tax whether the investment 
is made in State A or in State B: if in State A, State B has no basis to tax and 
the rate is 35 percent; if in State B, the State A resident pays a 25 percent tax to 
State B and receives a credit in the same amount to be applied against State A’s 
35 percent tax, leaving a 10 percent tax to be collected by State A, for a total 
tax of 35 percent.  Analogous treatment will apply to an investor situated in 
State B, who will face a 25 percent rate no matter where the investment is 
made.  (If it is made in State A, the State B investor pays $3.50 in tax but gets 
$1 from State B.)  An unlimited foreign tax credit system thus results in 
neutrality over the location of capital investment.  Under these assumptions, 
                                                
16 [CITE.] 
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$10 of wealth is created after one year, just as in the non-tax world, but $3.50 
in net tax revenue is collected if the investor resides in State A ($2.50 to State 
A and $1.00 to State B), and $2.50 if in State B ($3.50 to State A and -$1.00 to 
State B).  This type of neutrality is referred to as capital export neutrality, or 
CEN.17  CEN also is sometimes referred to as production neutrality to reflect 
the idea that productive activity is based on identical pre-tax returns to all 
investment, meaning that the worldwide distribution of capital and the resulting 
productivity of capital are unaffected by taxes.18 
Universal residence-based taxation also preserves so-called capital 
ownership neutrality (“CON”), a benchmark recently introduced into the legal 
literature by Desai and Hines.19  A tax system preserves CON when it does not 
affect patterns of ownership.  The importance of CON becomes apparent if one 
considers the fact that ownership patterns, like investment patterns and savings 
decisions, though perhaps to an even greater degree, are elastic to taxes.  In any 
developed market, firms can buy or dispose of business assets with relative 
ease, and the transaction and personal costs of doing so are likely to be lower 
than those of either capital or individual locational shifts.  Indeed, Desai and 
Hines argue that for modern economies, ownership considerations dominate 
locational decisions because so much of international trade consists of the 
development and distribution of intellectual property as well as the exploitation 
of different capabilities sourced in different jurisdictions; it does not primarily 
involve movements of capital.20  On this view, the typical form of cross-border 
investment is not the transfer of physical capital or the movement of its owners, 
but the shift in ownership of stationary capital from one country’s nationals to 
another’s.  Concomitantly, when ownership moves out of the jurisdiction, it is 
more commonly replaced by an offsetting ownership shift elsewhere than by a 
net movement of capital.  New owners step in to fill the void created when 
property changes hands.  In short, cross-border transactions are mostly about 
                                                
17 James R. Hines Jr., Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income, 62 TAX 
L. REV. 269, 272 (2009). 
18 Hines, Reconsidering, at __. 
19 Desai & Hines.  They also have introduced the cognate benchmark of 
national ownership neutrality to reflect national rather than worldwide welfare 
maximization where ownership is elastic to taxes.  Id., at 956.  The discussion here is 
confined to the examination of worldwide welfare-maximizing benchmarks. 
20 Desai & Hines, at 956. 
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aligning competencies to manage fixed-base capital, not about moving capital 
into or out of productive jurisdictions.21 
Thus, in the simplest case, suppose that the locations of all capital and 
all taxpayers are fixed but that taxpayers can acquire capital at home or abroad.  
In a first-best world without taxes, some optimal pattern of ownership of the 
fixed supply of worldwide capital will emerge, reflecting on one hand 
synergies of combined ownership of different productive activities, the 
advantages of vertical over horizontal integration, and other factors weighing in 
favor of combination, and on the other hand the advantages of specialized 
ownership of specialized industries, the limitations of hierarchical 
organizations to manage large or heterogeneous sets of assets and business 
opportunities, competitive price pressures, and other factors weighing in favor 
of dispersed ownership.22  If the introduction of taxes differentially affects the 
tax burden on prospective owners, then tax considerations are apt to alter this 
optimal pre-tax pattern of ownership, resulting in efficiency losses. 
2. Second Variation: Territorial Taxation 
Although a pure residence-based FTC system eliminates capital 
location incentives, it does not preserve neutrality along a number of other 
margins, including uniformity in savings versus consumption decision, 
uniformity in ownership considerations (in the case of a world of mixed 
systems for tax relief), and uniformity in investor location; it also does not 
preserve “competitive neutrality,” which functions less as a genuine neutrality 
benchmark than as a plea for equal treatment.  When sensitivity to taxes along 
these margins is large, distortions may result from pursuing CEN that are no 
less harmful than distortions in patterns of home- and host-country investment 
that worldwide taxation is designed to eliminate. 
The other major (and by far more widely adopted) method of double 
tax relief, foreign income exemption, or so-called territorial taxation, addresses 
these problems.23  Under a pure form of territorial taxation, states exempt 
residents’ foreign-source income, loss and expense from the tax base entirely.24  
                                                
21 Id. (“[M]ost FDI [(foreign direct investment)] represents transfers of control 
and ownership, and need not involve transfers of net savings.”). 
22 See Hines, Reconsidering, at 275-77. 
23 [CITE to figures on numbers of jurisdictions.] 
24 In practice, most territorial systems adopt some worldwide features (and 
vice-versa) to prevent tax avoidance.  Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless Income, at __.  
As an example, the opportunity to shift profits earned in high-tax jurisdictions to low-
 9 
In this setting, double taxation is eliminated because the only tax investors face 
on cross-border investment is foreign-source tax.  Returning to the example 
above, the resident of State A will face a 25 percent rate of tax if the 
investment is made in State B, with State A ceding its right to tax entirely, and 
a 35 percent rate if it is made at home.  Analogously, a resident of State B will 
face the same rates on investment in State A and State B that the State A 
resident does. 
A world of territorial systems has the following distinctive properties.  
First, the after-tax rather than the pre-tax rate is everywhere the same, as 
investment flows out of low-return jurisdictions and into high-return ones until 
the worldwide rate equalizes.25  Although capital is not optimally allocated 
(since its allocation is affected by tax considerations), there is a tradeoff in that 
the decision about whether to save or consume, which is based on after-tax 
rather than pre-tax rates of return, is no longer differentially affected by taxes.  
This state of affairs is referred to as “savings neutrality”26 and, by some 
scholars, as “capital import neutrality” (“CIN”).27  Second, universal 
territoriality preserves what is sometimes termed competitive neutrality, or the 
idea that all investors face the same tax burden on investment in a given source, 
regardless of their residence.  Perhaps unfortunately, competitive neutrality 
also often goes by the name CIN.28  Although, as explained below, competitive 
neutrality sounds more in considerations of national than worldwide welfare, it 
has been particularly influential as a driver of international tax policy in a 
number of countries, including the U.S.29  Third, universal territorial taxation, 
like universal worldwide taxation, preserves CON, as the after-tax return to the 
owner of a fixed-base investment is the same regardless of who owns it.  And 
finally, and perhaps most obviously, territorial systems eliminate the incentive 
to alter the location of the owner of capital in response to taxes, since tax rates 
                                                                                                                  
tax jurisdictions has caused some territorial jurisdictions, such as Japan, to impose 
floors on the rate applied to certain foreign-source income.  Id. 
25 Hines, Reconsidering, at __. 
26 Altshuler, at __. 
27 Id., at __. 
28 Musgrave; Knoll, at __.  Knoll notes that lawyers have tended to interpret 
CIN as a competitiveness benchmark (explained in the text below), while economists 
have interpreted it as a savings benchmark, and that the two groups have not always 
recognized they are talking about different benchmarks in using the term “CIN.” 
29 Kleinbard, Lessons, at __. 
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do not vary with the location of the owner, taking the location of the 
investment as fixed. 
B. Neutrality Tradeoffs 
The framework of international taxation and relief of double taxation 
described in Subpart A sets the parameters for scholarly debate on international 
tax neutrality.  This Subpart provides an overview of the tradeoffs that the 
various neutrality benchmarks present and canvasses some of the recent 
literature on international tax neutrality. 
1. Homogeneous Systems 
The efficiency question in evaluating any proposed tax system is which 
of the available arrangements minimizes total deadweight loss for the relevant 
population.30 here assumed to be countries worldwide, though in some analyses 
it is national welfare.31  Most scholars have agreed that in the comparison of 
worlds consisting solely of pure versions of either territorial or worldwide 
systems, the latter is superior in promoting worldwide welfare.32  Another way 
of stating the point is that it is believed that promoting productive neutrality 
and accepting the associated savings, competitive and investor location 
distortions produces less deadweight loss than the converse.  As a general 
matter, this conclusion seems correct. 
Begin with tax-induced locational shifts.  As a factual matter, it seems 
that owner location response to tax incentives is likely to be relatively minor.33  
And under the stylized assumptions here, the failure to preserve locational 
neutrality of capital owners would not seem to merit concern anyway, since the 
location of the owner ought to have little impact on worldwide productivity.  
Thus, suppose that the quantity of capital and the identity of its owners as 
fixed, so that the sole tax-based incentive that arises under a pure worldwide 
system is for an owner in a high-tax jurisdiction to move to a low-tax 
jurisdiction, leaving capital where it is.  The owner then would enjoy the low-
tax jurisdiction’s crediting of foreign tax paid in excess of source tax due when 
it makes economic sense to locate the investment in the higher-tax jurisdiction.  
As a result, total worldwide output would continue to be maximized despite the 
tax-induced decision to change the residence of the owner.  Under these 
                                                
30 Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. 
Tax Policy?, 60 TAX L. REV. 155 (2007). 
31 See id., at 157. 
32 Hines, Reconsidering, at __. 
33 Kirsch, at __. 
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stylized circumstances, it is unclear what inefficiency arises.  Rather, the 
effects, if any, will be distributive and on administrative costs, as tax revenues 
will be eroded in low-tax source jurisdictions while administrative costs are 
shifted to them. 
These considerations become somewhat less decisive if one relaxes the 
unrealistic assumption that the quantity of capital available for investment is 
fixed.  Treating this margin as somewhat tax-elastic, the fact that worldwide 
systems preserve production neutrality must be weighed against the fact that 
they do not preserve savings neutrality.34.  If one assumes there is a single, 
optimal worldwide rate of return to savings, then worldwide taxation 
introduces distortions in the decision to save or invest.  Investors located in 
high-tax jurisdictions will have a greater incentive to consume currently than 
will investors who face a better after-tax return to savings.  A territorial system 
avoids this distortion because the after-tax return to all investments worldwide 
will converge to a single worldwide rate, for, if there were differences in the 
after-tax rate of return in two jurisdictions, capital would flow to the one 
providing the higher rate (even though the allocation would not be desirable in 
terms of production efficiency) until rates were equalized.35 
Although territorial systems preserve savings neutrality, the 
proposition that savings neutrality is a proper subject of efficiency analysis 
when the focus is on worldwide welfare is debatable.36  Differing incentives to 
save or consume across jurisdictions would appear more a reflection of 
differing policy choices about the optimal mix of private and public returns to 
savings than an inefficiency traceable to tax-motivated incentives for cross-
border investment.37  Further, it is not clear that savings decisions are as 
responsive as capital location decisions to taxes;38 higher taxes may induce 
both income and substitution effects among savers, meaning that some 
taxpayers may save more (on a pre-tax basis) in the presence of the tax than in 
its absence in order to ensure they have adequate savings in light of a greater 
                                                
34 Altshuler, at 257; Horst, at __. 
35 Id. 
36 Hines, Reconsidering, at __. 
37 See Hines, Reconsidering, at 274 (“As a practical matter, since many 
national policies influence the return to savers, CIN is often dismissed as a policy 
objective . . . .”).  See also Knoll, at __. 
38 See DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE 
RICH (Slemrod ed., 2000) (presenting research on the sensitivity of savings decisions to 
tax rates). 
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loss of returns to taxes.39  Nevertheless, the view that the inefficiency resulting 
from non-uniformity in returns to savers has equal status with production 
inefficiency has had a significant influence in the literature,40 and a number of 
scholars have framed the question of optimal tax design in terms of the relative 
efficiency losses arising from pursuing either efficiency benchmark – 
production versus savings.41 
Finally, consider competitive neutrality, or the idea that some form of 
neutrality exists when investors meet on an equal tax footing in a given 
jurisdiction.42  Returning again to the discussion example, if States A and B 
each tax on a territorial basis, then investors from either jurisdiction face the 
same rate on income from the source that an investor located in the source 
faces on its source-based investment, regardless of the rates that States A and B 
impose on domestic income.  This arrangement is competitively “neutral” in 
the sense that home-country rules do not disadvantage home residents in their 
competition with other taxpayers for investment in the host.  However, as 
contrasted with CEN and, at least arguably, with savings neutrality, CIN as 
competitive neutrality does not promote worldwide welfare; indeed, it does not 
appear directly to promote the welfare of any constituency other than host-
country multinationals resident in high-tax jurisdictions, for the benefits to 
them are offset by detriments to those against whom they compete for 
investment.  (And serving even this benchmark assumes that other jurisdictions 
do not retaliate against the residence jurisdiction’s decision to pursue 
competitive neutrality).43  Consequently, competitive neutrality has been 
                                                
39 For an explanation of income effects, see ROSEN, at __. 
40 Altshuler, at 256 (“The standard result [in the analysis of the efficiency 
properties of residence- and source-based taxation] is that a pure residence system 
ensures efficiency in investment location decisions whereas a pure source system 
preserves efficiency in savings decisions.”).  Knoll, at 14. 
41 Althsuler, at 258.  See generally Knoll, at 13-14; Horst, at __.  It also has 
been observed that the availability of deferral in worldwide systems such as the United 
States’, coupled with the formality of corporate residence for U.S. tax purposes, makes 
it easier for taxpayers to shift the location of capital owners to lower-tax jurisdictions, 
thereby moving toward savings neutrality.  Altshuler, at 257. 
42 Musgrave, at 8. 
43 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, The Role of U.S. Policy in Offshoring, 
BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM 457, 473 (2006).  (“Thus, capital import neutrality [in the 
competitiveness sense] generally puts the international competitiveness of a country’s 
multinational firms ahead of considerations regarding optimal investment location or 
government revenue.  For example, capital may be allocated inefficiently toward low-
tax locations because after-tax rates of return in such locations are higher.”) 
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characterized as “rooting for the home team”44 rather than a genuine neutrality 
benchmark, though it might more aptly be characterized as trickle-down 
neutrality for home-country residents who, in theory, could benefit from home-
country multinationals’ prosperity.  Perhaps the best one can say about 
competitive neutrality is that it sounds in some theory of investor equality.45   
The final neutrality benchmark, CON, does not come into play in the 
comparison of pure, homogeneous systems.  Both the universal adoption of 
pure worldwide tax systems and the universal adoption of pure territorial 
systems preserve CON.46  The result is easier to see for the latter case, because 
under territorial systems all investors face the same tax with regard to any 
investment having a fixed situs.  However, because worldwide systems cause 
all investors to place the same relative after-tax value on all investments that 
they would place on them in the absence of taxes, ownership shifts resulting 
from taxes will not result in that setting, either.47  Consequently, it is fair to say 
that CON advocates do not have a dog in the fight between homogeneous pure 
worldwide systems and homogeneous pure territorial systems. 
2. Mixed and Limited Systems 
More realistic difficulties with promoting CEN arise if the idealized 
assumptions of the preceding section are relaxed.  In the actual world, no 
residence-based system provides an unlimited FTC, heterogeneity of methods 
of double-tax relief obtains, and some amount of deferral of foreign-source 
income is available under worldwide systems.  Each of these real-world 
features introduces tax distortions for states seeking to promote CEN.  Begin 
with the case of the limitation on FTCs.  As a practical matter, a country that 
provided an unlimited FTC would suffer dramatic erosion of its tax base, as net 
capital importing countries could raise taxes arbitrarily high with no adverse 
effect on levels of inbound investment from countries using the FTC regime.  
Consequently, no country has permitted FTCs in excess of the taxpayer’s 
erstwhile domestic tax liability.48  The limitation means that residents of FTC 
jurisdictions with lower rates face higher taxes on investments in high-tax 
jurisdictions than on investments at home or in other jurisdictions having rates 
                                                
44 Kleinbard, at __; Shaviro, at __; 
45 Shaheen, at 210. 
46 Desai & Hines, Evaluating International Tax Reform, at 495. 
47 See Knoll, at [draft pages 22-23] for a numerical example; see also Hines, 
Reconsideration, at 276-77. 
48 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 904()(). 
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not in excess of the home rate.  Residents of high-tax FTC jurisdictions, 
however, will face the same rate on investments wherever located.  In addition, 
residents of high-tax FTC jurisdictions have an incentive to locate both 
themselves and capital in low-tax jurisdictions, since then, but only then, can 
they secure the lower tax rate they would otherwise obtain just by relocating 
themselves and leaving capital where it was in a system of unlimited FTCs.49   
The net effect of both phenomena is to create a worldwide bias towards 
investment in lower-taxed jurisdictions, which effectively moves the world in 
the direction of territorial taxation.  Depending on the magnitude of the effects, 
a formal switch to territoriality could actually be welfare enhancing, since it 
eliminates tax-induced shifts of ownership that arise under an incomplete 
implementation of worldwide taxation while preserving savings neutrality and, 
more importantly, ownership neutrality. 
Heterogeneity of tax systems has a similar effect.  In a multi-state 
world in which one or more jurisdictions adopt territorial taxation, residents of 
countries employing a residence-based FTC system are at a tax disadvantage 
when compared with residents in territorial jurisdictions with respect to 
investment opportunities in low-tax jurisdictions.  To illustrate, consider a 
world composed of States X, Y and Z.  X and Y each impose tax at a flat 35 
percent rate, but whereas X adopts worldwide taxation with an FTC for its 
residents and nationals, Y adopts a territorial system under which neither 
foreign-source income nor foreign-source expense is accounted for.  Z is a net 
capital importing country that has adopted a flat 10 percent rate on Z-sourced 
income.50  (Z’s method of taxing non-Z-sourced income is immaterial for the 
example.)  Now, when compared to Y residents, X residents face a tax 
disadvantage with respect to the Z-sourced investment, because X residents 
cannot respond to the tax advantage of the Z-sourced investment, while Y 
residents can.  The difficulty that this type of situation creates forms the basis 
for regular pleas from U.S. industry for the U.S. to move to a territorial system, 
as most industrialized nations have done.51 
More importantly, the tax-insensitivity to ownership considerations 
that arises in a world of residence-based systems disappears in a world of 
                                                
49 Hines, Reconsidering, at 273; Peggy B. Musgrave, “Capital Import 
Neutrality,” in Joseph J. Cordes et al., eds. Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy 
50, 50 (2005). 
50 See Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless Income, __, __ at 15ff., for a discussion 
of this problem. 
51 Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless Income, at __.  Kleinbard describes these 
pleas as demands that the U.S. move to “cartoon territoriality.” 
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mixed systems.52  In the mixed setting, the incentives that residents of 
worldwide tax jurisdictions face differ from the incentives that residents of 
territorial jurisdictions face, as illustrated in the example in the preceding 
paragraph.  In particular, residents of high-tax, residence-based jurisdictions 
will be at a disadvantage compared to residents of high-tax territorial 
jurisdictions when it comes to investment opportunities in low-tax jurisdictions, 
because they lack the incentive that residents of territorial jurisdictions have to 
invest in the low-tax jurisdiction.  Especially if the factual contention is true 
that most cross-border transactions involve shifting ownership of fixed-base 
capital, the tax disadvantage to a country employing a high-tax worldwide 
system becomes very large, while the tax loss of shifting to a territorial system 
becomes very small.53 
Finally, consider the problem of deferral, as exemplified by the U.S. 
case.  Formally, the U.S. pursues CEN through worldwide taxation of its 
citizens and residents together with the provision of a limited FTC.54  
Consistent with the standard assumptions discussed in Section 1, the costs to 
individuals of escaping U.S. tax on income directly owned by the taxpayer are 
relatively high, because doing so generally requires the individual to leave the 
U.S., something most residents are reluctant to do.  Consequently, it would 
appear that the U.S.’s promotion of CEN increases worldwide welfare more 
than would its promotion of (either version of) CIN.  The difficulty with this 
analysis is that under U.S. law, the cost of shifting the identity of the immediate 
owner of capital to a non-U.S. person is quite low, because corporate residency 
for U.S tax purposes is almost entirely a formal matter.  It depends upon the 
place of incorporation, not the location of significant managerial, production or 
other operations, or on ultimate beneficial ownership of corporate capital.55  
When coupled with the fact that most active business income of foreign 
corporations that are owned by U.S. persons is not taxed until it is repatriated,56 
                                                
52 Id., at 276. 
53 Desai and Hines derive $50 billion (in 2004) as a rough estimate of the 
dollar value of the annual efficiency losses to U.S. multinationals from the U.S. system 
of quasi-worldwide taxation (i.e., worldwide taxation with significant deferral 
opportunities).  Desai & Hines, at 955. 
54 See 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(b) (U.S. citizens and residents are subject to tax on 
their worldwide income.); 26 U.S.C. §901 (foreign tax credit). 
55 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(4). 
56 The U.S. system requires immediate inclusion by certain U.S. persons of 
corporate profits earned through certain controlled foreign corporations and passive 
foreign investment companies.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 951-959 (“Subpart F”) & 1291 
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the result is a tax system that approaches territoriality because of deferral and 
the ability of taxpayers to time inclusions with offsetting losses.57  As a 
consequence, the neutrality question in the U.S. setting has to some extent 
devolved into a question of determining the appropriate limits on deferral.58  If 
the ultimate U.S. owners of non-U.S.-source income can defer inclusion for 
U.S. tax purposes for long enough, the fact that the income ultimately is subject 
to tax at U.S. rates will not deter taxpayers from shifting formal ownership 
from domestic to foreign entities.  This shifting is completely at odds with 
CEN, because the incentive arises to move capital to the low-tax jurisdiction 
based on the after-tax, not pre-tax, rate of return there.  In effect, deferral 
pushes the system closer to territoriality.59  However, it comes with the further 
disadvantage that a substantial efficiency loss arises from the tax cost on 
repatriation of foreign profits under the U.S. system.  Because the U.S. 
continues to tax foreign-source income when it is repatriated, the large 
incentive to earn income offshore is coupled with a large disincentive to bring 
it into the U.S.  This disincentive has regularly given rise to pleas from U.S. 
multinationals, occasionally successful,60 for both short-run relief in the form 
of tax holidays and the transition to a full-blown territorial system.61 
3. Conclusion on tradeoffs 
Against the backdrop of the considerations outlined above, a lively 
debate in the U.S. context has emerged on the relative merits of worldwide and 
territorial taxation, principally on the question of whether the U.S. should move 
                                                                                                                  
(PFICs).  Neither of these regimes, however, currently taxes most earnings of actively 
conducted foreign businesses. 
57 See Kleinbard, Stateless Income, for a comprehensive analysis of the 
problem. 
58 See, e.g., Roseanne Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on 
Deferral, 20 TAX NOTES INT’L 1579 (Apr. 3, 2000).  If, for example, the discount rate 
is 5 percent, then ten-year deferral of tax reduces the effective rate by approximately 39 
percent; twenty-year deferral reduces it by 62 percent. 
59 E.g., Hines, __; Shaviro, at 160. 
60 See,.e.g., American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-357) § 422 
(enacting 26 U.S.C. § 965, which provided for a temporary reduction in rate, to 5.25 
percent, on certain foreign income repatriated to the United States). 
61 See Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless Income, at __.  Kleinbard notes that 
most of these pleas are for systems that he terms “cartoon territoriality,” that is, 
systems so generous as effectively to permit full tax exemption for U.S. multinationals.  
Id. 
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to shore up its worldwide system or instead move to more full-blown 
territoriality.  Those taking the latter position have argued that substantial 
deadweight loss arises when the residence or owner of capital changes in 
response to taxes, as it must when the system is heterogeneous or the FTC is 
limited.62  That is, they have argued that there is no reason to bear the 
efficiency losses associated with tax-induced changes in ownership and savings 
non-neutrality, or the losses from competition with investors located in 
territorial jurisdictions, when the benefits from doing so – limited neutrality 
with respect to the location of capital, or CEN – have been lost anyway.  On 
top of these losses are additional ones resulting from the tremendous incentive 
to keep offshore earnings offshore unless and until they can be repatriated on a 
tax-favored basis.63  A territorial system would remove this incentive (as would 
a purer worldwide one.)  Others have argued that territorial taxation is not 
inferior to residence-based taxation even on first-best grounds and that it is 
much preferable given the much wider use of territorial systems today.64  For 
example, from the perspective of CON, the adoption of territoriality would be 
superior to remaining with a residence-based system in light of the wide use of 
territoriality by other countries and the contention that most of the losses 
associated with taxing cross-border transactions arise from inefficient 
ownership of fixed-location capital.65 
On the other side, a number of commentators have argued that the 
solution to the problem of corporate residence-shifting is to tighten up the rules 
on deferral, thereby moving closer to a true worldwide system, and not to 
abandon the ideal of CEN.66  In response to the Desai and Hines argument that 
the dominant margin of tax-induced behavior is ownership, some have argued 
that ownership is, at best, one of a number of relevant margins of response to 
tax rules and that no evidence has yet been offered to show that tax-induced 
                                                
62 A prominent example is the proposal that President George W. Bush’s tax 
reform panel made to move to an exemption system.  President’s Advisory Panel on 
Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair & Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax 
System 103-07 (2005).  For a critique of the Panel’s proposal, see J. Clifton Fleming Jr. 
& Robert J. Peroni, Exploring the Contours of a Proposed U.S. Exemption (Territorial) 
Tax System, 109 TAX NOTES 1557 (2005). 
63 See Desai & Hines, at __, and Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless Income, at __, 
for discussions of this problem. 
64 E.g., Shaheen. 
65 Hines, Reconsidering, at 282. 
66 See, e.g., Fleming & Peroni. 
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ownership effects swamp capital location effects.67  And against the view that 
worldwide taxation is inadvisable on competitive grounds when most 
jurisdictions pursue territorial taxation, it has been noted that even territorial 
jurisdictions tend to adopt worldwide tax features for foreign-source income 
that is subject to exceptionally low rates, that most industrialized countries tend 
to have rates roughly comparable to each other (so that tax considerations may 
be minimized as long as it is not possible to exploit tax havens), and that if the 
U.S. moved closer to true worldwide taxation, other countries might follow 
suit.68 
Which of these positions is correct depends in some measure on who is 
right about the economic facts – where the margins are more elastic, and what 
the efficiency costs are of responding to tax incentives along one or another of 
them.  But the assumption that there are answers to these questions depends on 
the more basic assumption that neutrality is a well-formulated concept, for if it 
is not, then it is not clear what it means to say that one set of tax rules is more 
distorting than another and consequently is associated with greater efficiency 
losses.  The next part makes the case that neutrality is not well defined in the 
international context; in the parts following I offer an alternative way to 
consider the relationship between tax rules and productivity and an argument 
for applying different policy criteria in evaluating international tax rules. 
II. Neutrality Generally 
The discussion in Part I was designed to explicate the problem that 
double taxation of cross-border income poses for efficiency analysis and to 
give a flavor for the debates surrounding the relative merits of various methods 
of double-tax relief.  In what follows, I offer a criticism of the supposition that 
the relevant baselines for the evaluation of tax distortions are well specified.  
As contrasted with narrower inquiries into whether one or another local legal 
change is likely to increase or reduce efficiency system-wide, the global 
question of which international tax regime is closest to an ideal of neutrality is 
not well formulated.  In the former case, one can make a meaningful evaluation 
of the effects of a new rule in light of reasonably fixed background conditions; 
in the latter case, one cannot make sense of the ideal against which the actual 
world is to be measured, because the ideal turns out to be affected by the world 
for which it is supposed to operate as an ideal. 
This feedback effect materializes because any system for taxing cross-
border arrangements causes economic actors to make decisions that affect not 
                                                
67 E.g., Kane. 
68 Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless Income. 
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only the amount of tax paid, but who gets it.  When economic decisions cause 
tax revenue streams to be redirected from one jurisdiction to another, they 
affect the absolute productivity of the factors of production in both jurisdictions 
because of the relationship between tax revenues and tax amenities.  As 
productivity rates diverge from prior levels, the rate of return that was 
supposed to remain uniform across jurisdictions under the relevant benchmark 
(e.g., pre-tax for production neutrality, after-tax for savings neutrality) diverges 
as well, meaning that the benchmark is not maintained. 
One can frame the point as follows.  There are not two but at least three 
moving parts to the analysis of the effects on rates of return of any regime for 
taxing cross-border income: the flow of capital (and possibly labor or 
investors) in response to taxes, the adjustments in both net importing and net 
exporting countries to the relative prices of factors of production that result 
from these flows, and the effects of these two effects on tax revenues.  The first 
two items are part of the standard fare of neutrality analysis,69 but the third, 
which is not, is no less important to a comprehensive analysis of a tax system’s 
neutrality properties.  Because levels of funding for tax amenities affect the 
absolute rate of return to factors of production in each jurisdiction, tax-induced 
adjustments to tax revenues, no less than changes in the relative supply of and 
demand for factors of production, will affect the productivity of those factors, 
and indeed in ways that diverge between the affected jurisdictions.  This 
divergence means that neutrality by definition is not satisfied, because 
preservation of the relevant rate of return is the criterion of tax neutrality. 
This Part illustrates the problem by examining the development of the 
neutrality model in the domestic setting and the difficulties that arise when the 
model is appropriated for use in the international setting.  Subpart A explicates 
the concept of tax neutrality in general terms.  Subpart B examines the question 
of how to articulate the problem of non-neutrality in the international setting, 
concluding that the most cogent statement of the problem is one that analyzes 
the effects of moving from a system of closed to one of open economies.  
Because this statement also subverts the idea of the single-tax-affected baseline 
that underwrites the analysis of tax distortions, it seems that the concept of 
neutrality in the international setting cannot be well formulated. 
                                                
69 See, e.g., Desai & Hines, Hines, Knoll, Shaheen. 
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A. Tax Neutrality Generally 
Under the standard public finance model, a tax is optimally efficient 
when it does not change relative prices.70  A tax that has this property is said to 
be neutral.  Correlatively, if taxes do change relative prices, then prices are said 
to be “distorted” and, when the change alters the decisions of economic actors, 
the decisions are said to be distorted as well.71  The reason it is considered 
appropriate to characterize such tax-affected decisions as distortions is that they 
produce less total social wealth than would result in their absence.  This 
conclusion follows if one accepts the assumptions commonly applied to 
describe the behavior of rational actors in free markets – namely, that they have 
ordered preferences, that they are free to deploy their resources to satisfy those 
preferences and that there are no externalities.72  In this setting, total social 
wealth is maximized.73  Consequently, when decisions are affected by tax-
induced changes to relative prices, the resulting arrangements do not maximize 
total social wealth, because individuals have substituted less-efficient outcomes 
for more-efficient ones as a means to maximize their after-tax welfare.  The 
reduction in total social wealth that arises through these substitution effects is 
referred to as the deadweight loss, or excess burden, of taxes.74 
The following simple example illustrates these ideas.  Suppose that a 
taxpayer faces two investment opportunities, one of which, Opportunity A, has 
an expected value of $X and the other of which, Opportunity B, has an 
expected value of 0.9*$X, in both cases on a pre-tax basis.  In the absence of 
tax considerations, and disregarding the possibility that risk preferences might 
                                                
70 See, e.g., HOWARD ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE  __ (20__).  Tax-induced 
changes in relative prices are to be distinguished from tax-induced changes in absolute 
prices, which also may cause taxpayers to alter the composition of goods and services 
they consume or the labor they supply.  Id., at __.  To the extent a tax-induced price 
change is absolute, the alteration in behavior is said to result from so-called income 
effects, or the fact that the taxpayer is poorer in absolute terms by reason of paying the 
tax and, consequently, may have a lower budget line.  Id., at __.  Income effects are not 
inefficient, though they may be problematic for other reasons, such as, for example, 
that they reduce the wealth of the wrong person. 
71 Id., at __. 
72 [Econ. textbook.] 
73 This is simply a statement of the first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics, which itself can be considered a formal version of Adam Smith’s theory of 
the invisible hand.  See, “Welfare Economics,” in Eatwell et al., eds., 4 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 889 (1987). 
74 ROSEN, at __. 
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affect the investment decision, the taxpayer would choose Opportunity A.  If, 
however, Opportunity A is sufficiently less favorably taxed than Opportunity 
B, the taxpayer will choose Opportunity B, other things equal.  In such a case, 
the decision is distorted by taxes as compared to a baseline of the efficiency-
maximizing non-tax world.  In the example, $0.9X rather than $X of total 
social wealth is created, simply because the ultimate value to the taxpayer is 
greater if the non-wealth-maximizing choice is made. 
The “non-tax” world is a standard heuristic employed to get at the idea 
that taxes create the kinds of inefficiencies described above.75  However, the 
non-tax world cannot function as a true baseline for the simple reason that 
taxes are necessary to fund infrastructure and other goods that make possible a 
system of competitive markets in which rational actors satisfy their ordered 
preferences.  In other words, the non-tax world would seem to require taxes in 
order to function as the baseline against which to measure the effect of taxes.  
This difficulty, however, can be largely gotten around if one bears in mind that 
the problem is not, strictly speaking, the existence of taxes but the fact that 
most real-world taxes create substitution effects because tax liability is 
determined, in part, by economic decisions.  Stated otherwise, real-world taxes 
alter the relative prices of goods.  For example, even a broad-based income tax 
creates an incentive to work less if leisure goes untaxed, because the tax alters 
the relative prices of work and leisure.  Consequently, we can expect leisure to 
be over-supplied and labor to be under-supplied even under a broad-based, 
low-rate income tax system, when compared to a system in which tax revenue 
is raised in some way that does not affect the decision about how much labor to 
supply. 
The question, then, is whether it is possible for revenue in fact to be 
supplied in a way that does not affect behavior.  In general, a tax imposed 
without regard to what the taxpayer does – generally referred to as a lump-sum 
tax – would have this property.76  A head tax is the simplest example of such a 
tax.  Although a head tax may affect taxpayer behavior simply because 
taxpayers have fewer resources, and may be objectionable on distributive or 
other grounds, the absolute reduction in wealth it effects does not lead to 
inefficient substitutions, but only to less consumption (or more production) as a 
                                                
75 Id., at __. 
76 The statement should be qualified because lump-sum taxes have a distorting 
effect if it is assumed that labor supplied solely to satisfy a lump-sum tax burden 
creates additional social costs that must be internalized.  See, David M. Hasen, 
Liberalism and Ability Taxation, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1057, 1108-13 (2007).  The 
complication is disregarded here. 
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way to compensate for the reduced wealth.  Relative prices remain unaffected 
and, as a result, resources continue to be allocated optimally.77  Distributive 
concerns can, theoretically, be addressed either through government 
redistribution or by tailoring the lump-sum tax liability to whatever non-
behavior-affected metric is deemed appropriate.78 
If one begins with the idea of a lump-sum-tax financed, non-tax 
affected world as the baseline, it becomes possible to sketch a model of tax 
neutrality in the closed economy setting.  A revenue target is exogenously set 
based upon some procedure by which relevant preferences are aggregated and 
sorted.  This exercise is part of the larger procedure for identifying and 
implementing what is commonly termed the “social welfare function,:79 or the 
societal determination about how to weight individual utilities and other 
tradeoffs among conflicting values.  For example, in a democratic polity, voters 
might express their preferences about levels of tax-financed amenities through 
a referendum in which the majority prevails, or the choice might be mediated 
through the election of representatives empowered to make decisions about 
such matters.80  The level having been set, a base and rate schedule are then 
adopted.  The latter decisions would, it is hoped, be based on efficiency 
considerations and take into account as well the various additional costs of 
administering the tax system.  Although the base is unlikely to include, much 
less to consist solely of, lump-sum taxes, it is at least possible to have in view 
the economy that would result if the desired levels of tax-financed amenities 
were funded with lump-sum taxes.  That economy represents the “non-tax 
world,” or more accurately, the non-tax-affected world, and deviations from 
that world that result from tax-induced substitution effects represent tax 
                                                
77 ROSEN, at __. 
78 Thus, the standard assumption in the public finance literature is that the 
optimal theoretical tax would be a lump-sum tax assessed on the basis of wage rate, or 
ability (not actual wages).  An ability base would seem to combine the tax neutrality 
properties sought from an efficiency perspective with the desired utility-maximizing 
distributive properties, assuming the declining marginal utility of ability.  See id., at __.  
A large literature addresses the philosophical cogency of this view.  See Linda Sugin, A 
Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229 (2011) 
(reviewing the literature). 
79 See, e.g., ROSEN, at __. 
80 See Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax 
Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904, 913-14 (2011), for a discussion of social welfare 
functions. 
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distortions.  The world has its own distributive and productive properties, 
including a pre-tax rate of return. 
It is important to be clear about the conceptual price that employment 
of the idea of the non-tax affected world exacts on the theory of tax distortions.  
Initially, the observation that the existence of a rate of return requires tax-
financed amenities vitiated the notion of a non-tax-world that would operate as 
a baseline to measure tax distortions.  The basic idea of that model, however, is 
not that there are no taxes but that taxes do not affect decision making by 
causing taxpayers to substitute more favorably-taxed goods or services for 
those less favorably taxed.  It was then recognized that if taxes were 
conceptualized as imposed on a lump-sum basis, the link would be severed 
between the funding of goods paid for with tax revenues and the avoidance 
behavior of the individuals that pay for them.  The resulting model mostly 
solves the problem of establishing the conditions under which a non-tax 
distorted rate of return is possible even though taxes must somehow be 
collected, but it is not complete.81  Since different quantities of tax-financed 
goods supplied correspond to different quantities of tax-financed amenities and, 
in consequence, different rates of return,82 one cannot establish the rate of 
return in the non-tax affected world without a specification of the revenue 
target.  The target itself, however, cannot be derived from the conditions 
imposed by the model but, rather, must be taken as an exogenously given 
amount based on a normative judgment – for instance, by ascertaining and 
applying the applicable social welfare function.  The model itself does not 
specify the target, and it cannot be read off as a fact about the world. 
B. Adapting Neutrality to the International Setting 
The question on the table is whether the closed-economy model can be 
adapted to the international setting without loss of normative or analytic power.  
In the international setting, the analog of the non-tax-affected world is the non-
double-tax-affected world.83  That is, one level of real tax (together with its 
                                                
81 The statement is qualified as “mostly,” because the model assumes that 
additional work undertaken solely to satisfy a tax burden does not itself create 
additional costs that must be paid for with additional tax revenues. 
82 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Lau et al., Efficiency in the Optimum Supply of Public 
Goods, 46 ECONOMETRICA 269, 269 (1978) (noting “the dependence of private 
consumption, and hence of tax revenue, on the supply of public goods”). 
83 Technically, it would be more accurate to refer to the analog of the non-tax-
affected world as the “single-tax-affected world,” since double non-taxation creates 
problems analogous to those of double taxation.  As it is commonly framed, however, 
the problem is one of double taxation arising from the joint rights of source and 
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distortions) is taken as given, and the question is how that level will be 
maintained in light of the rights of both home and host countries to tax cross-
border transactions.84 
The trouble is that, as will be developed below, no matter the starting 
point, tax-motivated behavior that results from the chosen neutrality regime 
fails to preserve the relevant rate of non-tax-affected return (pre-tax or after-
tax) over all affected jurisdictions.  As capital flows respond to the tax 
incentives created under the rules for cross-border transactions, tax revenues 
are redirected between affected jurisdictions.  Over the long term, levels of tax-
financed amenities and of productivity diverge as well, causing real rates of 
return to move in opposite directions in the affected jurisdictions.  Any 
benchmark defined with reference to the preservation of a rate of return 
therefore is not met and neutrality is not preserved.  This result implies that the 
non-double-tax affected world cannot be specified for any system of 
independent jurisdictions in which tax rules create incentives that cause tax 
revenues to be redirected from one jurisdiction to another. 
The following discussion develops these ideas by examining three 
possible non-double-tax-affected starting points and evolutions to the real-
world case: a tax-free world to which taxes are added on; a world of open 
economies, each of which initially has the same tax rate in which rates are then 
made to differ across jurisdictions; and a world of single-taxed, closed 
economies that become open economies.  It will be seen that only the last of the 
starting points actually states the problem in a coherent way.  But that way of 
formulating the problem demonstrates both that “neutrality” is violated as soon 
as cross-border trade is introduced, and that the resulting tax-motivated 
decisions are as likely to improve as to harm overall productivity. 
                                                                                                                  
residence to tax; double non-taxation generally arises because of tax base 
inconsistencies or strategic efforts to avoid tax, both topics that fall outside the scope of 
the present discussion. 
84 Thus, tax treaties typically describe the elimination of double taxation as a 
or the central objective of the treaty. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE 
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 
Introduction, ¶ A.2 (“Broadly, the general objectives of bilateral tax conventions may 
today be seen to include the full protection of taxpayers against double taxation 
(whether direct or indirect) . . . .”) (available at: 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan002084.pdf). 
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1. First Possible Approach: From Non-Tax to Single-Tax World 
The first approach posits as a baseline a tax-free world and an 
associated tax-free rate of return to capital.85  In this setting, the question 
becomes what happens to rates of return and capital allocations when different 
jurisdictions impose different rates of tax and adopt different methods of 
double tax relief. 
For the reasons stated above, this approach never really gets off the 
ground.  Because taxes are necessary to finance various goods needed for well 
functioning markets to exist, a genuinely tax-free world would be one that 
lacked the features of a market economy; it would be one of rudimentary trade.  
As the preceding subpart explained, this problem arises in the closed economy 
setting as well, but it can be solved for the most part by substituting, with only 
minor loss of explanatory power, the concept of the non-tax-affected world.  
The non-tax-affected world is operationalized (ideally) through lump-sum 
taxation.  However, the concept of the non-tax-affected world requires an 
exogenously specified decision about the amount of tax revenue to be raised, 
since this target, together with other factors, determines the “pre-tax” rate of 
return.  Without such a specification, the non-tax affected world is 
indeterminate, because different levels of exogenously given (via lump-sum 
taxation) funding result in different rates of return in the non-tax affected 
world.  Consider, for example, the absolute productivity differences of capital 
(human and physical) between two countries of roughly equal population but 
dramatically different levels of development and taxation: Algeria and Canada.  
Taking GDP per capita as a proxy for capital productivity, capital in Canada is 
approximately 550 percent more productive than in Algeria.86  Undoubtedly 
many factors contribute to this difference, but among them are the relative 
differences in transportation infrastructure, educational opportunities, a well-
functioning and reliable administrative state, and other features of 
industrialization that are paid for with taxes and that contribute to the capacity 
of private parties to develop and diversify human capital and native resources.  
Notably, the percentage of GDP that goes to taxes in Canada is higher than the 
percentage in Algeria by approximately the same ratio: 32.2 percent versus 8 
percent.87 
                                                
85 See, e.g., Shaheen, at __. 
86 Canada’s GDP per capita in 2010 was $39,057, and Algeria’s was $6,950, 
in each case in purchasing power parity dollars.  Figures are IMF estimates, available 
at: http://tinyurl.com/6e6acpx. 
87 Heritage Foundation 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, available at: 
http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-variables. 
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2. Second Possible Approach: From Single Rate to Divergent Rates 
A second approach would begin from a world in which all states 
imposed the same level of tax and adopted some form of double tax relief, and 
then examine the efficiency consequences, under alternative methods of double 
tax relief, if tax rates are then made to diverge.  Since in the initial state all 
jurisdictions impose tax at the same rate, it would appear that under any 
method or methods of double tax relief, the initial state of the world would be 
non-double tax distorted.  Thus, the results under worldwide taxation with an 
unlimited FTC would be the same as under pure territorial taxation.  Each 
taxpayer would face one rate of tax that is the same across jurisdictions, paid in 
every case to the source.  The single rate also would apply in a world of mixed 
jurisdictions, in which some states adopted territorial taxation and the others 
worldwide taxation with an FTC.  Again, each taxpayer would face a single 
rate of tax paid exclusively to the source.  However counterfactual as a 
practical matter, this world at least would provide a theoretical articulation of 
the standard against which to measure tax distortions: a single-tax-affected 
world in which all individuals face the same rate of tax regardless of location of 
individual or capital and regardless of ownership.  The system of double-tax 
relief under varying tax rates that created the least distortion from the baseline 
of the system under identical tax rates then would be the most efficient. 
This method of conceptualizing the non-tax distorted world is 
somewhat better than the first, but fundamentally it does not address the 
problem.  It requires the same decision on initial tax rates that individual states 
operating as closed economies face in setting a revenue target.  Since 
heterogeneity on this decision is what characterizes the essential nature of the 
problem – as well as the actual world – it is not possible to pick a fixed rate that 
represents a non-distorted baseline without making a normative decision about 
appropriate levels of tax-financed amenities.  Therefore, even though it is 
possible to model the actual world as a set of variations from any particular, 
arbitrarily chosen baseline, one would not be entitled to conclude that the 
efficiency costs associated with the variations represented distortions. 
One might counter that, at least within a plausible range, all states 
would choose to impose taxes at a rate that approximately maximizes the return 
to privately held capital.  On this view, heterogeneity outside of the range 
would not be the product of divergent national tastes on levels of tax-financed 
amenities; rather it would result from political, technical or other constraints on 
the capacities of different jurisdictions to impose taxes at ideal rates.  One then 
could identify a rate within the range as a neutral target (assuming it could be 
identified), acknowledging that the target rate functions as a proxy for the 
range itself. 
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As an initial matter, it should be noted that the assumption that 
variations in tax burdens are due to technical or other factors appears to be 
inconsistent with reality, as widely varying tax burdens measured as a 
percentage of GDP obtain among countries not apparently under external or 
technical constraints to tax.  As examples, the U.S. burden is approximately 
26.9 percent, while larger Western European countries tend to impose levels 
nearer to 40 percent; Scandinavian countries hover in the mid- to high 40-
percent range.88  Further, the assumption that states would, if they could, seek 
to maximize the returns to privately held capital within a range faces the 
technical difficulty that the optimal ratio of public to private investment for 
such a purpose is likely to depend on a variety of country-specific factors.  
Therefore it cannot be specified as a uniform world rate.  As examples, 
different countries may face different requirements for defense spending per 
capita; for state-funded roads, waterways and other infrastructure; and for 
educational outlays in order to optimize the exploitation of local resources.  
Therefore uniformity in initial starting point will have to be absent unless one 
assumes that the initial rate is set to meet a worldwide optimal revenue target 
and that extra collections in some jurisdictions are transferred to other 
jurisdictions in order to ensure that adequate tax amenities are financed 
everywhere. 
Neither of these solutions solves the problem of identifying a non-
double-tax affected world.  If initial uniformity is lacking, then the non-double-
tax affected world will have to have different after-tax returns in different 
jurisdictions in order to preserve the single pre-tax rate of return worldwide.  
But investors seek to maximize after-tax, not pre-tax, returns, assuming they 
have the capacity to adjust their investments in response to tax variation.  (If 
they lack the capacity, then the problem of tax non-neutrality doesn’t exist 
anyway.)  Consequently, they will adjust their arrangements to maximize their 
after-tax revenue, replicating the problem that the solution is designed to 
address. 
If, instead, a single rate with transfer payments is assumed, then a well-
formulated model of the non-double-tax affected world results (if one is willing 
to accept the imprecision arising from the fact that states may have different 
tastes for tax-financed amenities within a range).  However, this approach 
assumes away the problem, since it is the existence of distinct, autonomous 
jurisdictions that gives rise to the actual problem that analyses of neutrality are 
designed to address.  That is, the problem is how to move towards tax 
                                                
88 Figures are from OECD tax database and are for 2008, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3746,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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neutrality in a system of sovereign nations that, if they cooperate at all, tend to 
do so through quite limited means, such as bilateral treaties that are not 
enforceable through any supra-national authority.  The assumption of tax 
transfer payments coordinated worldwide in effect reformulates the problem as 
one for a single, closed economy. 
Finally, even if one assumes both that states generally agree that 
optimal tax rates are those that maximize the return to privately-held capital 
and that a single rate for all countries could reasonably approximate that 
optimal rate, it turns out that what is meant by tax neutrality cannot be 
specified without also articulating an optimal rate.  From this perspective, 
distortions would not be measured by the extent to which patterns of 
investment in the actual world differ from those that would obtain if some 
version of territoriality or worldwide taxation were implemented, without 
absolute adjustments in rates.  Rather, distortions would have to include a 
measure of the departure of tax revenue in any particular jurisdiction from what 
would be necessary to maximize the return to privately-held capital there.  As 
an example, if it turned out that the optimal rate were uniform but, say, 45 
percent, then even if every jurisdiction imposed tax at the same rate, there 
would be tax distortions unless that rate happened to be 45 percent.  Such an 
approach is inconsistent with the idea that the non-double-tax-affected world is 
the world of existing pre-tax returns, coupled with a single level of tax. 
3. Third Possible Approach: From Closed to Open Economies 
A third approach would begin from the well-defined case of a set of 
closed economies in each of which income taxes are levied at a rate based upon 
a prior decision about desired levels of tax-financed amenities.  Within the 
framework of the problem as traditionally posed – how to preserve the 
neutrality associated with a single level of tax in the cross-border setting – this 
approach is superior to the prior two because the starting point is well-defined 
and tax-neutral; it is in fact the same starting point that is used for the analysis 
of closed economies.  In addition, it enjoys a greater consonance with historical 
practice, as domestic economies historically have dwarfed international 
economies in size.89 
                                                
89 According to the director general of the World Trade Organization, between 
1950 and 2010, world trade grew from approximately 5.5 percent to approximately 29 
percent of world GDP.  Pascal Lamy, “Facts and Fictions in International Trade 
Economics,” p. 3.  Speech given at Conference on Trade and Inclusive Organization, 
Apr. 12, 2010 (available at: 
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In this setting, the question becomes whether and how one can preserve 
the initial neutrality when borders are opened.  It will be seen that what is 
properly called neutrality – namely, the removal of tax effects across some 
specified margin  – is vitiated once cross-border trade is introduced, unless 
elasticity along the margin of behavior is not associated with redirection of tax 
revenues from one jurisdiction to another.  In particular, as capital moves in 
response to taxes, tax revenues in each affected jurisdiction diverge from the 
target that was set initially and was associated with a prior decision about 
desired productivity levels prior to the introduction of cross-border trade.  
Because the effect of changes in tax revenue on capital productivity can be 
large, the divergence from the closed-economy baseline that results has a 
significant impact on both pre- and post-tax rates of return and consequently on 
the level of taxes necessary to maintain the previously set baseline.  The 
feedback effect of tax-induced capital flows on tax revenues and, ultimately, on 
the productivity of factors of production makes it impossible to articulate a 
neutrality standard compatible with cross-border trade among distinct, 
sovereign tax jurisdictions. 
Thus, consider a system of two states, A and B, in which the 
economies initially are closed.  Pursuant to their own internal political 
processes, each state selects a level of tax amenities and a tax base and rate 
designed to supply those amenities in a reasonably efficient manner.  State A 
taxes at a high average rate, devotes much of its tax revenue to building 
institutions and infrastructure and, in consequence, has a high level of 
productivity, expressed as GDP per capita.  State B taxes at a low rate and has a 
correspondingly lower level of productivity.  The question is what happens 
when borders are opened and capital flows from one jurisdiction to the other. 
(i) Non-Preservation of Savings Neutrality 
Suppose that A and B adopt systems of territorial taxation on the basis 
that they wish to promote savings neutrality.  Savings neutrality, it will be 
recalled, holds when all investors face the same after-tax return to savings.  
When that criterion is met, it is not possible for total global welfare to be 
improved by reallocating some savings from investors in low-tax jurisdictions 





to investors in high-tax jurisdictions.90  Worldwide allocations of goods to 
savings and consumption are asserted to be Pareto-optimal.91 
By the terms of the standard analysis,92 universal territorial systems 
satisfy savings neutrality because they cause capital to flow from high- to low-
tax jurisdictions until the after-tax return to savings is the same everywhere.  In 
the stylized world under consideration here, when borders are opened, capital is 
expected to flow from A to B as investors reap the benefits of lower taxes 
there, which make the after-tax rate of return higher.  As capital flows out of A 
and into B, its relative supply in the former drops and in the latter rises, 
causing, respectively, an increase and a decline in after-tax rates of return to 
capital in the two jurisdictions relative to the rates that obtained immediately 
prior to the opening of borders.  The flow continues until after-tax rates 
equalize, at which point equilibrium is reached and the economic return on the 
decision to save or invest is the same in A and B.  Savings neutrality, under this 
view, is preserved. 
The standard analysis disregards the fact that if capital begins to flow 
from A to B, then under territorial taxation A’s tax revenues will drop, and, 
over time, the level of tax-financed amenities in A will drop as well.  The drop 
in amenities will lower the pre- and after-tax rates of return to investment in A 
apart from any effect caused by changes in the relative supplies of factors of 
production there.  That is, the drop in amenities will lower the value of A-sited 
assets in real terms.  (Note that if A raises its rates to compensate for the 
reduction in tax revenue, the incentive to move capital out of A to B becomes 
greater, undermining the effectiveness of the revenue-raising measure.)  B’s tax 
revenues will rise, with parallel but opposite effects. 
In this setting, it is not clear what significance there is to the resulting 
neutrality in savings decisions.  The asserted efficiency property of savings 
neutrality is that it prevents taxes from influencing investors’ decisions to 
allocate more or less than they would to savings in the absence of taxes,93 or, 
more accurately, in the absence of lump-sum taxes.  The result qualifies as 
efficient on the standard assumption that non-tax-affected decisions maximize 
productivity, because they are based on real market prices, not tax-affected 
prices.94  The conclusion does not hold, however, if real, (pre-tax) market 
                                                
90 Altshuler, at 257. 
91 [CITE to standard text on Pareto-optimality.] 
92 See, e.g., Shaheen. 
93 Altshuler, at 257. 
94 See Part II.A. 
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prices depend on inputs that are supplied with taxes.  Stated in the converse, if 
tax amenities contribute to productivity, then real market prices are not given 
by pre-tax prices, but by those prices plus some portion of assessed taxes, 
which means that the payment of taxes contributes to the value, not just the 
price, of the good purchased. 
In the closed economy setting, this truth was implicitly acknowledged 
in the recognition that taxes were necessary, but it could be safely disregarded 
on the basis that tax revenues were supplied through lump-sum taxation.  With 
lump-sum taxation, neither the real tax price of goods (the cost of providing tax 
amenities) nor the real tax benefit to goods (the value received for that tax price 
in the form of enhanced productivity) is impounded into prices; taxes are 
determined and assessed separately from the economic activity that gives rise 
to the need for tax revenues.  In the closed economy setting, where the demand 
for tax benefits may be taken as fixed, this separation poses little difficulty.95  
In the real-world, open economy setting where goods and taxes flow across 
borders, things are different.  Neither the supply of tax payments nor the 
demand for tax benefits can be taken as fixed.  The supply of tax payments is 
not fixed because taxes are not assessed on a lump-sum basis.  The demand for 
tax benefits is not fixed because the flow of capital and labor across borders 
changes the burden on infrastructure in each jurisdiction and thereby alters the 
productivity of factors of production there.  Each of these effects poses 
problems for efficiency analysis, because they cause actual revenue received to 
diverge from the revenue target required to maintain a given rate of (pre-tax) 
return.  Indeed, the fact that the demand for tax benefits adjusts in response to 
economic activity means that distortions would arise as borders were opened 
even in a world in which all taxes were of the lump-sum variety. 
Returning to the case at hand, once it is acknowledged that taxes 
purchase part of the return to savings – that is, that taxes are not merely a cost 
added on to savings – it is not possible to maintain that identity of after-tax 
returns to savings is efficient if tax revenues or the burdens on infrastructure 
have been redirected from one jurisdiction to another along the way.  The 
efficiency produced by ensuring that investment decisions do not differ on 
substitution grounds from what they would be in pre-tax terms holds only when 
it is possible to assume that tax benefits will be separately supplied at the level 
necessary to support the pre-tax rate of return.  It is that assumption that makes 
what are called non-tax-affected decisions efficient, because it is that 
                                                
95 The problem is not completely solved even in the closed economy setting, 
because there may be infrastructure costs created by activity undertaken solely to 
satisfy a lump-sum tax burden.  See Hasen, Liberalism and Ability Taxation, at __. 
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assumption that authorizes backing out the tax cost of goods and the tax benefit 
purchased for them from their market prices.  The redirection of tax revenues 
and burdens on infrastructure from one jurisdiction to another in the open 
economy setting violates the assumption.  In order to assess the efficiency 
properties in that setting, one can no longer assume that the non-tax-affected 
world provides a benchmark of efficiency, because, as demonstrated above, 
their efficiency properties depend upon a fixed demand for tax benefits.  It is 
that assumption that ensures the Pareto-optimality of non-tax affected decision 
making. 
Thus, consider what happens as capital flows and tax revenues adjust 
in the example.  The real return to savings will be enhanced in B, the low-tax 
jurisdiction, as increased tax revenues improve the pre-tax rate of return there, 
causing increased investment.  Thus we have the seemingly odd result that tax-
induced behavior causes an increase in productivity, not a reduction.  The result 
is odd if one assumes that taxes are a pure cost, but perfectly sensible if one 
assumes that taxes buy something.  For a resident of A, the net exporter, capital 
becomes less productive, which means the same physical quantity of capital 
drops in value compared to the value it had in the pre-trade world.  The resident 
of A nominally gets the same return on investment as the resident of B, but A 
has less to invest in real terms.  The opposite effect on B, however, should be 
larger if B started with a lower level of tax amenities and lower productivity.96  
On balance, it is not clear whether savings decisions in the resulting, 
post-trade world are superior to the decisions that would be made if savings 
neutrality did not hold.  To see this, assume the same facts, except that A and B 
satisfy all revenue requirements via lump-sum taxation.  When borders are 
opened, capital will flow from B to A because of the superior return there.  If 
that were the sole effect, optimum savings decisions would result when rates 
equalized.  But the inflow of capital to A will impose an additional burden on 
A’s infrastructure, causing the revenue target to fall short of what is needed to 
maintain its higher productivity.  The opposite effect will occur in B.  If 
revenue targets are not adjusted, then in real terms asset prices in A will drop 
and in B will increase.  After-tax rates of return, however, will be identical in 
both jurisdictions.  If some tax revenue were allocated from B to A (or if some 
capital were reallocated from A back to B), greater over all productivity would 
result, meaning that the world of lump-sum taxes is not Pareto-optimal.  This 
implies that the non-tax-affected world is inferior to the tax-affected world. 
Such an allocation in fact is what occurs under territorial taxation.  
When capital moves from A to B in the original example, tax revenue is 
                                                
96 See Part III., below. 
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redirected from A to B.  Productivity in B is increased, resulting in a tax-
affected world that is superior to the non-tax-affected world given that B began 
with fewer tax amenities than A. 
(ii) Non-Preservation of Production Neutrality 
Similar conceptual difficulties arise if A instead pursues CEN, or 
identity of pre-tax returns, through a system of residence-based taxation with a 
FTC.  In this case, as capital flows from A to B, A initially will retain some 
revenue on its residents’ B-sited investments, and there may be only slight 
adjustments to the levels of tax-financed amenities in A in consequence; 
indeed, the adjustments could go either way depending on the relative 
reductions in A’s tax revenue and the demand for it to pay for tax amenities in 
A at the rate that was chosen before borders were opened.  However, the 
indifference of A’s investors to tax rates in B (at least up to A’s rate) gives B 
an incentive to raise rates and improve its tax amenities, thereby increasing the 
pre-tax rate of return in B and, in consequence, attracting more capital to B.  
The increase in B’s productivity will then reduce the residual tax revenue 
available in A to finance tax amenities there – especially since more capital 
also will be attracted to B as a result of its improved productivity.  Again, the 
result is reduced productivity in A.  And, just as in the territorial case, despite 
the fact that the relevant benchmark is satisfied (here, CEN, or identity on pre-
tax rates of return), it is clear that tax rules have caused locational adjustments 
that affect pre-tax rates of return in absolute terms, which were supposed to be 
preserved under CEN.  Therefore, it again is not clear what the normative 
significance is of satisfying the benchmark.  Nor, conversely, is it clear why the 
fact that the tax law has induced locational adjustments means that the resulting 
state of affairs is distorted:  The pre-tax rate of return in A and B, which was 
supposed to function as a baseline to measure tax distortions, has itself been 
shifted in both jurisdictions, while the effect of tax-induced capital flows has 
been to increase productivity overall.  One again is left with the odd result that 
tax-induced flows of capital – that is, “distortions” – have resulted in greater 
rather than less productivity.  Indeed, tax-induced flows even have resulted in 
greater rather than less efficiency over all, when the latter is understood to 
include the realization of latent productive power available to capital and labor. 
(iii) Comparison With Ownership and Competitive Neutralities 
Capital ownership neutrality offers a useful contrast to savings 
neutrality and production neutrality on the question of the effects of taxation on 
productivity.  The case for pursuing CON over other benchmarks rests in large 
part on the contention that tax-induced ownership effects dominate capital 
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location and savings-spending decision effects.97  To the extent the facts 
support this contention, the feedback effects just discussed are muted, because 
tax rules generally do not redirect tax revenues into or out of jurisdictions if 
capital doesn’t move.  There may, however, be adjustments on the demand side 
for tax amenities even if the location of factors of production is fixed, meaning 
that some feedback effect may occur. 
Thus, consider again the example of States A and B as borders open, 
but assume that the only tax-sensitive margin is ownership.  In the first 
scenario, both A and B adopt territorial systems.  One would expect ownership 
shifts to occur as borders are opened, and, if one supposes that better tax 
amenities reliably produce greater competencies, it seems that in an initial stage 
there will be a net shift of ownership of B-sited assets to A residents.  Because 
gains from non-tax-affected trade can be expected to increase output over all, 
one would expect tax revenue increases in B as B-sited assets become more 
profitable.  However, as long as there is not a net reduction in productivity of 
assets remaining in A (by whoever held), tax revenue should not decline in A 
either. 
Whether A-sited assets remain as productive as before depends on 
what happens when A residents acquire more-profitable assets in B.  The CON 
story plausibly holds that when resident investors acquire foreign-sited assets, 
new owners enter to fill the void created by the investor’s decision to sell 
property at home in order to finance the foreign acquisition.98  It does not 
follow that the new investors of the residence-sited assets will be as effective 
owners as the old owners, but a guess based purely on intuition is that the long-
run tax revenue differences would not be large.  If, however, intuition fails and 
there is a material net reduction, then tax revenue would decline, much as in the 
case where it is assumed that capital is mobile and ownership is fixed. 
If A and B each adopt a worldwide FTC system, it would appear that 
the effect would be more muted still, because residual residence-based tax 
remains when ownership shifts from low-tax to high-tax residents. 
These considerations suggest that it is an empirical question whether 
tax revenue streams or burdens on tax-financed infrastructure will be 
dramatically affected by tax rules.  As indicated above, there is wide 
                                                
97 Desai & Hines, at __. 
98 Hines, Reconsidering, at 277-78. 
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disagreement on the question of which margins of investor behavior, if any, 
dominate in response to tax rules.99 
Finally, a word on competitive neutrality.  As discussed in Part I, 
treating “competitive neutrality” as a genuine neutrality benchmark seems 
mistaken because there are no efficiency losses other than those associated with 
savings non-neutrality that result from failure to ensure that home and host 
residents face identical tax burdens on host-sited investment.  Not surprisingly, 
there are no implications for competitive neutrality from the fact that capital 
will move in response to lower rates (assuming capital location is responsive to 
tax considerations).  Competitive neutrality says nothing explicitly or implicitly 
about relative productivity in home and host. 
III. Neutrality as a Combination of Rates and Amenities 
This Part attempts to quantify the conceptual point described in Part 
II.B.  The extent of the effect of tax rules on productivity depends on the 
relationship between tax revenues and tax amenities.  This Part accordingly 
attempts to provide measures of that relationship and of the magnitude of the 
effect on tax revenues from tax-induced capital flows.  It begins with a simple 
model and then explores the consequences for productivity under the model 
when capital enters or leaves the jurisdiction in response to taxes. 
A. Estimating the Value of Tax Amenities 
Technically the question of interest is the quantity of those tax-
financed governmental goods and services that contribute to productivity that 
are needed to support a given level of productivity.  I have been referring to 
these goods as “tax amenities.”  Redistributive taxation and taxation for the 
provision of what might be called pure consumption benefits, such as public 
parks for enjoyment, are not relevant. 
The precise relationship between tax amenities and productivity is, 
undoubtedly, quite complex and certainly varies depending on such factors as 
the size of the jurisdiction, its available resources, social and political views 
about various matters, and other variables.  Rather than seek to tease out the 
relationships among these factors and productivity, I proceed with a more 
tractable, if less precise, model.  The object here is to specify the general nature 
of the relationship between taxation and productivity, not to model particular 
jurisdictions. 
                                                
99 See, e.g., Kane, at __; Stephen E. Shay, Commentary Ownership Neutrality 
and Practical Complications, 62 TAX L. REV. 317, 319-24 (2009). 
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It is helpful to begin with the observation that most tax amenities 
exhibit characteristics somewhere between those of “pure private goods” and 
“pure public goods.”  A pure private good is one whose unit price can be 
determined under a standard model of supply and demand; it exhibits no 
externalities and its owner bears all associated costs and enjoys all associated 
benefits.100  Pure private goods also exhibit the characteristics of 
“excludability” and “rivalry,” meaning, respectively, that the good’s 
availability can be limited to those who pay for it and that one person’s 
consumption of the supply of the good reduces its availability for consumption 
by another. 
A pure public good, by contrast, would be entirely non-rival and non-
excludable.101  National defense is close to a pure public good because militias 
provide a benefit to all residents without regard to the amounts of tax they pay 
that support national defense and, within limits, without regard to population 
size.  Clean air is a similar example.  For these goods, it is impossible to 
exclude those who do not pay for it from enjoying it, and the enjoyment of it by 
anyone (whether paying or not) does not reduce the quantity available for 
others to enjoy. 
In practice, most state-provided goods exhibit some aspects of non-
rivalry and non-excludability, but they are not “pure.”102  (The converse 
similarly holds: few market-supplied goods are pure private goods.103)  Locally 
provided amenities such as street cleaning or schools exhibit less of these 
characteristics, since ordinary market forces, such as the cost of housing, may 
determine who gets to enjoy the benefits.  A public school may be open only to 
community residents (excludability), and there are limits to the number of 
attendees (rivalry). 
It has been noted that public goods cannot be priced under the standard 
model applicable to private goods because of endemic market failure, which 
takes the form of positive externalities.104  In particular, non-excludability 
creates a free-rider problem in that the goods are enjoyed by non-purchasers, 
                                                




104 See generally, Barbara Fried, __ CHAPMAN L. REV., __, for a discussion of 
the problem. 
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and non-rivalry means that pricing presents a collective action problem.105  As 
a consequence, the use of market mechanisms to supply public goods will 
result in a systematic undersupply unless there is someone who so values the 
good that it is worthwhile for that person to provide it even if no compensation 
from other beneficiaries is forthcoming.  A large literature explores the 
problem of funding public goods in a manner to get around these difficulties.106 
Although the pricing of public goods is relevant to the problem of their 
supply, here the concern is not so much with setting prices but with 
determining the value they add to factors of production via tax amenities.  
What, in general, does it cost to supply a given level of productivity, and how 
is that cost related to the quantity of capital in the jurisdiction, assuming that all 
tax amenities are financed with tax revenues? 
If tax amenities were pure private goods, the feedback problem of tax-
induced capital flows on tax revenues and, consequently, on tax amenities 
would disappear.  In that case, each unit of capital would be ticketed with just 
the taxes that it requires in order to be as productive as it is for a given rate of 
tax, and not more.  Net capital exports would reduce total taxes collected and, 
concomitantly, total tax amenities supplied by exactly the amount no longer 
needed in the jurisdiction to maintain the same level of capital productivity, 
while net capital imports would increase them analogously.  But tax amenities, 
even though narrowly construed to include solely those tax-purchased goods 
that contribute to the productivity of capital, are not pure private goods, and the 
cost of providing them cannot be assumed to be linearly impounded into taxes 
assessed on capital.  Many tax amenities, such as national defense or the 
broadcast spectrum, have costs that are not systematically related to the 
quantity of capital in the jurisdiction.  Other tax amenities, such as a court 
system, public safety or transportation infrastructure, have costs that are partly 
related and partly unrelated to the quantity of capital present in the jurisdiction.  
More generally, it seems reasonable to suppose that for a given level of capital 
productivity, tax amenities will be supplied partly from public goods financed 
with fixed costs and partly from public goods the cost of which varies in 
(some) proportion to the amount of capital in the jurisdiction. 
Equation (1) attempts to capture these intuitions in a simple, stylized 
model that relates GDP per capita, a proxy for capital productivity, to the 
                                                
105 Id. 
106 The seminal paper is Samuelson’s The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 
36 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS, 37 (1954).  See John Hudson & Philip Jones, “Public 
goods”: An exercise in calibration, 124 PUBLIC CHOICE 267, 267 (2005). 
([Samuelson’s] definition has become a ‘standard’ textbook description.”). 
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product of the logarithms of total taxes collected per capita and country 
population, backing out, however, taxes paid for pension contributions.  The 
underlying intuitions may be summarized as follows: 
(i) over the range of reasonable possible tax burdens, taxes are positively 
correlated with capital productivity because taxes pay for 
infrastructure; 
(ii) by backing out the largest single item (retirement) that is largely 
unrelated to productivity and using a log function, a reasonable 
approximation of taxes used to fund productive activity is employed;107 
(iii) especially in the case of public goods, there are returns to scale for 
larger countries so that, all else equal, the same quantity of tax revenue 
per capita will fund more infrastructure in a country with a larger 
population than with a smaller one; and 
(iv) the use of logarithm functions is appropriate because both the benefit 
from greater tax burdens and the benefit from greater population 
exhibit the property common to many economic inputs of being 
constantly declining, so that the next dollar of tax revenue or the next 
person is not as valuable as the last in improving GDP per capita. 
Thus: 
GDPi = logn(Ti + C1)*logn(Pi + C2), (1) 
where GDPi is gross domestic product per capita as a share of a reference GDP 
per capita, Ti is tax revenue per capita as a share of reference tax revenue per 
capita, and Pi is population as a share of reference population, in each case in 
jurisdiction i.  The C-terms are constants.  Reference rates are used to avoid the 
problem of expressing relative productivity levels and tax burdens in dollars or 
other units. 
Because the model under consideration attempts to derive the 
consequences of international tax rules on productivity as economies move 
from relatively closed to more open status, an older data set is a better 
candidate than a newer one for an approximation of the relationship between 
tax revenue and population on one hand and productivity on the other for a 
closed economy.  The earliest year for which data are readily available is 1980.  
                                                
107 Additional outlays that could have been backed out include unemployment 
insurance; public consumption goods such as parks; and transfer payments from high-
income to low-income persons.  The first and third of these items plausibly contribute 
materially to productivity, while the second is generally inconsequential in amount.  
[CITE.] 
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At that time, world trade accounted for approximately 16 percent of world 
GDP (as contrasted with approximately 29 percent by 2010).108  Expressing 
total taxes in Country i as a fraction of U.S. total taxes and population in 
Country i as a fraction of U.S. population, a regression for then-member OECD 
countries against the exponent of GDP per capita (expressed as a fraction of 
U.S. GDP per capita) was run for 1980.109  The parameters derived for the 
regression are: C1 = 1.3228, and C2 = 2.4750.  The two independent variables 
appear to account for approximately 75 percent of the variation in GDP/capita, 
although tax revenue per capita alone accounts for nearly 65 percent of total 
variation.110 
Substituting these values into Equation (1) yields: 
GDP/capi = logn(Ti + 1.2899)*logn(Pi + 2.9285), (1’) 
where GDP/cap is expressed in terms of the fraction of U.S. GDP per capita, Ti 
is expressed as the fraction of total U.S. tax revenue, and Pi is expressed as a 
fraction of U.S. population, all in 1980.  Total tax revenue includes both 
income and other taxes and includes sub-national tax revenue.  Table 1 lists 
predicted productivity levels under Equation (1’) associated with different 
levels of tax revenue for selected population and tax revenue values. 
                                                
108 United Nations figures, available at __. 
109 The data set consisted of all OECD member countries in 1980 except 
Iceland, Luxembourg and Sweden.  Iceland and Luxembourg were excluded because 
they were judged too small in population to be representative, while Switzerland was 
excluded because it was judged to be a tax haven and, therefore, unlikely to exhibit the 
properties of a relatively closed economy funding its infrastructure primarily with taxes 
from domestic productive activity.  Additional attributes of the data set and results for 
statistical significance are provided in the Appendix. 
110 R2 is 0.7979.  See Appendix. 
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Table 1: Productivity at Selected Tax Revenues and Populations 
a. Population equal to U.S. population (1980) 
 Tax rev. per capita as percent 
U.S. tax rev. per capita 
GDP per capita as percent 
U.S. GDP per capita 
1.  200 162.91 
2.  180 154.33 
3.  160 145.16 
4.  140 135.36 
5.  120 124.79 
6.  100 113.34 
7.  80 100.84 
8.  60 87.08 
9.  40 71.77 
10.  20 54.54 
b. Population equal to one-half U.S. population (1980) 
 Tax rev. per capita as percent 
U.S. tax rev. per capita 
GDP per capita as percent 
U.S. GDP per capita 
1.  200 139.19 
2.  180 131.86 
3.  160 124.04 
4.  140 115.65 
5.  120 106.62 
6.  100 96.83 
7.  80 86.15 
8.  60 74.40 
9.  40 61.32 
10.  20 46.60 
 41 
c. Population equal to one-twentieth U.S. population (1980) 
 Tax rev. per capita as percent 
U.S. tax rev. per capita 
GDP per capita as percent 
U.S. GDP per capita 
1.  200 121.25 
2.  180 114.87 
3.  160 108.05 
4.  140 100.75 
5.  120 92.88 
6.  100 84.36 
7.  80 75.05 
8.  60 64.81 
9.  40 53.42 
10.  20 40.60 
B. Productivity Consequences of Capital Flows Under the Model 
Whether and how capital will flow as the world moves from a system 
of closed economies to one of open economies (i.e., capital flow consequences) 
are topics developed in Part IV, but it is worth considering in a general way the 
revenue and productivity consequences that the model predicts assuming that 
significant amounts of capital do flow into or out of a representative 
jurisdiction.  In order to simplify the analysis, the following assumes that all 
countries derive one-half of their tax revenues from a flat-rate income tax, with 
the balance derived from taxes and fees not dependent upon the presence of 
capital in the jurisdiction.  It also assumes that one-half of world income is 
derived from labor and one-half from capital.  This assumption is one possible 
approximation of the generally accepted view that labor accounts for between 
40 and 60 percent of GDP, and capital the balance.111  Thus, under these 
assumptions, one-quarter of world tax revenue derives from income taxes laid 
on capital.  Finally, it is assumed that tax rates are not adjusted to reflect 
increases or reductions in tax revenues resulting from capital movements. 
                                                
111 OECD. 
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1. Territorial Systems 
In a system of universal territoriality, the flow of capital out of a 
jurisdiction is associated in the short term with the elimination of all income 
tax revenues generated by the capital from the resident jurisdiction and the 
generation of new tax revenue in the source jurisdiction (at the source rate).  It 
also is associated with the elimination of tax revenue from labor supplied in 
conjunction with the operation of that capital in the residence to the extent the 
labor is not reabsorbed into the residence economy; additional tax revenue 
resulting from the inflow of capital in the source arises on an analogous 
basis.112  Based upon the assumptions described above and in light of the 
associated revenue losses and gains resulting from capital movements, the 
exodus of one percent of capital from a jurisdiction leads to a minimum 0.25 
percent reduction in total tax revenues there.  Thus, the transfer of 20 percent of 
the capital from the residence to a source jurisdiction is associated with at least 
a five percent reduction in residence tax revenues. 
Consider a country having a population one-twentieth of the U.S. 1980 
population whose initial tax revenues per capita are 1.6 times that of the U.S. in 
1980.  This would be approximately the situation of a small Western European 
country such as Belgium.  Assume that, after borders are lifted, over time the 
country experiences 25 percent net capital outflow and an associated eight 
percent reduction in tax revenues, factoring in lost productivity from the sub-
optimal reallocation of labor to other activities in the residence.  Although 
residents would continue to own income generated by off-shore capital, the 
residence would experience a reduction in productivity of approximately 4.5 
percent due solely to reductions in tax revenues, from 108 percent of U.S. 
productivity to about 103.5 percent.113  This drop may not appear to be large, 
but even an economy five percent of the size of the U.S. economy would have 
approximately $729 billion in annual GDP,114 meaning that a four percent 
                                                
112 [CITE to text on production functions.] 
113 An eight percent reduction in tax revenue per capital from 1.6 times the 
U.S. level is 1.472 times the U.S. level.  Under Equation (1’), the resulting productivity 
is given by: logn(1.472 + 1.2899)*logn(0.05 + 2.71828) = 1.034, or 103.4 percent of 
U.S. productivity, a drop of approximately four-and-one-half percent from the level for 
tax revenue per capita equal to 1.6 times that of the U.S.  See Table 1.c., line 3. 




According to Equation (1’), a country one-twentieth the size of the U.S. with a per 
capita tax burden equal to 1.6 times that of the U.S. would have GDP per capita of 99 
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reduction in productivity is associated with approximately $29 billion in lost 
productivity, or more than $1,800 per person per year. 
Perhaps more importantly, a further effect of a reduction in in-country 
capital productivity is to make foreign investment still more attractive to home-
country residents, leading to a cycle of capital exodus that continues for as long 
as the reduction in productivity associated with lower tax revenues exceeds the 
increase in capital productivity associated with greater scarcity of capital in the 
jurisdiction.115  And if, as is commonly the case,116 the residence responds to 
falling productivity by reducing tax rates, the problem is likely to get worse 
unless the drop in rates encourages capital inflows.  (Whether it does depends 
upon the tradeoff to foreign investors between lower productivity in the 
residence and lower taxes there.  This subject is addressed in Part IV.)  Unless 
and until the drop in rates encourages net capital inflows, residence 
productivity will decline further still.  When equilibrium is reached, in-country 
GDP will have declined substantially below the optimum level that existed 
before borders were opened.  Whether the drop represents a worldwide 
productivity loss depends, however, on the capital productivity increase, if any, 
associated with the movement of capital into source jurisdictions and the 
associated infrastructure improvements resulting from additional tax revenues 
there.  Of importance for the neutrality question is that, however that analysis 
plays out, one cannot read off from the fact that capital flows into or out of the 
jurisdiction that neutrality either has been “maintained” or has not according to 
the benchmarks applicable to CIN – savings neutrality and competitive 
neutrality. 
In the case of a net capital importer, the situation is roughly reversed.  
A net 25 percent increase in capital inflow will be associated with a 25 percent 
increase in tax revenues and rising productivity.  Of course, this result 
presupposes that tax rates remain generally constant.  As discussed in Part IV, 
below, this expectation is not reasonable in a world of territorial states divided 
into net capital exporting countries and net capital importing countries. 
                                                                                                                  
percent of that of the U.S., resulting in an economy approximately five percent of the 
size of the U.S. economy. 
115 To be clear, the upward pressure on the price of capital remaining in the 
jurisdiction resulting from tax-induced outflows is a consistent theme of neutrality 
analysis.  See, e.g., Hines, Knoll, Shaheen.  The claim here is that the focus equally 
needs to be on the downward pressure on the price of capital remaining in the 
jurisdiction (relative to the price of capital in other jurisdictions) that results from the 
reduced productivity of capital as tax amenities go unsupplied. 
116  
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2. Worldwide Systems 
In worldwide systems, the productivity consequences of a net inflow of 
capital, without more, do not differ from those in territorial systems, while the 
consequences of a net outflow of capital may or may not differ markedly from 
those in territorial systems.  (As explained in Part IV, the incentives giving rise 
to capital flows do differ dramatically.)  As under a territorial system, in a 
worldwide system all tax revenue imposed by the source on imported capital 
flows to the source, and the associated benefits to tax amenities all arise there.  
The productivity consequences in the residence, however, depend upon relative 
tax rates.  If capital moves to a higher-taxed jurisdiction, the result is the same 
as in a territorial system, assuming the FTC is limited:  The residence 
experiences a net reduction in tax revenues equal to all tax on the departed 
capital, giving rise to the same reduction in productivity that arises under a 
territorial system.  (If the FTC is unlimited, there is an additional reduction in 
residence tax revenue equal to the difference between the tax on income at the 
source rate and the tax on income at the residence rate, resulting in even greater 
degradation of residence productivity.  However, as noted earlier no system 
provides or is likely to provide an unlimited FTC.117) 
If the source taxes at a lower rate than the residence, the residence 
retains residual tax revenue equal to the difference between the home- and 
host-country rates applied to net source-based investment income.  The 
productivity consequences of the retention are ambiguous.  The model of 
productivity developed in this Part is based on the theory that over the range of 
reasonably possible tax rates, tax revenues significantly drive the rate of return 
to privately-held capital.  The model further supposes that, for a variety of 
reasons, the increase or reduction in taxes on capital will be related to the 
logarithm of the pre-tax rate of return.  In other words, if, as capital leaves the 
jurisdiction, all the associated tax revenues leave the jurisdiction, the resultant 
reduction in tax revenues has a downward effect on productivity that exceeds 
the upward effect from having to supply fewer tax amenities by reason of the 
reduced quantity of capital present there.  By the same token, however, the 
departure of capital from a jurisdiction does imply that the burden on 
infrastructure, and consequently the cost of tax amenities, drops to some extent.  
Consequently, in a worldwide system where capital leaves a high-tax residence 
for a low-tax source, the effect on residence productivity from reduced tax 
revenues depends on whether the residual tax revenue in the residence covers 
the cost of maintaining the reduced need for tax amenities there.  This is an 
empirical question that is a function of a number of variables, including the 
                                                
117 See Part I.B., above. 
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initial quantity of tax revenue per capita in the residence (a higher amount 
associated with less reduction in productivity as capital leaves), the difference 
between the source and resident rates (a greater difference associated with less 
reduction in productivity as capital leaves) and the size of the residence (a 
larger population associated with less reduction in productivity as capital 
leaves). 
C. Conclusion on Neutrality and Amenities 
The discussion in this Part has developed the thesis, backed by 
evidence, that the presence in a jurisdiction of what I have termed “tax 
amenities” – infrastructure and other public or quasi-public goods that are paid 
for with tax revenues – plays a significant role in the productivity of capital 
there.  The ramifications of the thesis, if true, are reasonably far-reaching.  Part 
II developed the argument that any system for taxing cross-border transactions 
creates tax incentives that alter the absolute productivity of capital in any 
jurisdiction, assuming that capital moves in response to tax rules.  (Similar 
consequences follow if labor moves, a question not treated here.)  Changes in 
absolute productivity in the jurisdiction, no less than tax-induced movements of 
assets or changes to the relative supplies of labor and capital, have an effect on 
the “pre-tax rate of return” and indicate that productivity enhancements may 
result from tax what would count as tax distortions under the standard view of 
the effects of taxation on productivity.  One consequence of these observations 
is that it becomes hard to say what international tax neutrality is. 
This Part suggests that predictions about how capital will flow and the 
productivity consequences of capital flows as borders become more open differ 
markedly from predictions of the standard models.  Under those models, 
productivity is not made to depend on tax revenues, and tax rules accordingly 
are expected to have effects on productivity largely because of tax-induced 
changes allocations of resources to the wrong person or place and resulting 
misallocations of the relative supplies of and demands for factors of production 
in affected jurisdictions. 
Thus, if, when borders are lifted, the world consists of a system of 
territorial regimes, under the standard model capital can be expected to flow to 
the lowest-tax jurisdictions until after-tax rates of return there reach after-tax 
rates in the next-lowest-taxed jurisdictions, then to those latter jurisdictions, 
finally reaching a single worldwide after-tax rate with some significant amount 
of distortion in capital location once all tax benefits have been capitalized.118  
This pattern follows if one assumes that taxes generally represent a cost laid on 
                                                
118 See, e.g., Rosenzweig for a standard statement of the thesis. 
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top of other costs to investment.  Similarly, if ownership is the dominant 
margin along which behavior is elastic to taxes and a mixed system of 
worldwide and territorial regimes is in effect as borders become open, one can 
expect the identity of owners of capital to shift in similar ways until a single 
after-tax rate of return is reached with an associated (inefficient) pattern of 
ownership.119 
By contrast, under the approach developed here, it is unclear whether 
under a territorial regime capital will flow into low-tax jurisdictions or 
ownership will shift from high- to low-tax investors:  On one hand, for a high-
tax jurisdiction resident, the tax burden of investment is lower in a low-tax 
jurisdiction; but on the other hand, the absolute rate of return to capital in the 
low-tax jurisdiction is likely to be lower than it is in a high-tax jurisdiction.  
Whether it makes sense to move capital or change ownership to enjoy those 
lower tax rates depends on the tradeoff between them and the lower 
productivity associated with them – an empirical question the answer to which 
depends on actual productivity levels and rates in both jurisdictions. 
It is perhaps worth noting that the low levels of capital inflow into low-
tax jurisdictions suggested by a focus on tax amenities is consistent with 
observation.120  The theory that generates them also helps to explain the so-
called “Lucas Paradox,” which states that despite the fact that (standard) theory 
predicts net capital flows to low-cost jurisdictions, observed flows tend to run 
in the opposite direction – to high-cost jurisdictions.121  It would appear that the 
                                                
119 See, e.g., Hines, Reconsidering, at __, for a description of how ownership 
changes result from tax rules. 
120 As explained in the next note, capital does not uniformly flow from high- 
to low-cost jurisdictions, contrary to theoretical prediction. 
121 Robert Lucas, Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. 92 (1990).  The Lucas Paradox is more of a puzzle than it is a 
paradox.  Lucas attempted to explain the fact that capital flowed into the U.S. much 
more readily than into India in 1988, despite the fact that theory predicted the marginal 
productivity of capital in India would be 58 times higher than in the U.S.  Id.  Lucas 
offered two possible explanations: differences in “fundamentals,” or country-specific 
factors affecting productivity, and market failure. 
Alfaro et al. examine a larger data set for the period 1971-2000 and conclude 
that fundamentals are the key determinant.  In particular, they state:  “[L]ow 
institutional quality is the leading explanation for the Lucas Paradox.”  Alfaro et al., 
Why doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation, 
90 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 347, 347 (2008).  The explanation offered in this Article 
is consistent with Alfaro et al. inasmuch as many fundamentals, including those 
affecting institutional quality, tend to be financed with tax amenities. 
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puzzle can be partly explained, or at least better understood, once the role that 
taxes play in establishing productivity is taken into account.  In particular, a 
jurisdiction’s after-tax return to higher taxes will often, perhaps typically, 
exceed the after-tax return to lower taxes.  For example, consider a country 
one-twentieth the size of the U.S. in population having an initial tax amenity 
rate equal to 80 percent of the U.S. tax amenity rate in 1980.  Such a country 
would have an amenity tax rate of 20.62 percent122 and a model-predicted GDP 
per capita of 75.05 percent of U.S. GDP per capita.123  If the tax rate were cut 
in half, model-predicted GDP per capita as a fraction of U.S. GDP per capita 
drops to 53.42 percent.  Thus, while an investment earning $100 at the higher 
productivity rate would yield in $79.38 after-tax, the same investment at the 
lower productivity rate would yield approximately five-sevenths the return on a 
pre-tax basis, or $71.18.  The after-tax return would be $63.28.  A rational 
investor therefore would favor investment in the high-tax jurisdiction.124 
Finally, there are dramatic welfare consequences to tax-induced capital 
flows that have gone largely unnoticed in the literature.  The link between tax 
revenues and productivity means that the flow of capital in response to taxes 
has a multiplier effect on increases in productivity in the source and, at least in 
the case of territorial systems, on reductions in productivity in the residence.  
For the source, if statutory rates of tax remain constant (which they rarely do in 
a territorial world) the news generally would be good regardless whether the 
system is territorial or worldwide, as the source gets all the additional tax 
revenue associated with the net inflow of capital.  The additional tax revenue 
improves the rate of return in the source, thereby making it more attractive for 
additional investment.  This virtuous circle continues until the improvement in 
the rate of return is balanced by a reduction resulting from the increased 
relative supply of capital in the source as a factor of production. 
                                                
122 In 1980, the U.S. tax rate (national and sub-national) as a percentage of 
GDP per capita was 26.40 percent, of which 78.1 percent, or 20.62 percent of GDP, 
was devoted to spending on tax amenities.  OECD. 
123 See Table 1.c., Line 7. 
124 Other tax explanations for the Lucas Paradox have been offered.  For 
example, Kleinbard notes that the capacity of multinational firms to divert income 
economically earned in high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions for tax purposes 
removes the added cost of investing in high-tax jurisdictions while enabling the 
investor to reap the greater productivity benefits there.  Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless 
Income, at __.  Kleinbard’s explanation is entirely consistent with the theory of tax 
amenities offered here, since it presupposes that the absolute pre-tax return to 
investment in high-tax jurisdictions is superior to that in low-tax ones. 
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By contrast, for the residence, the news is likely to be bad – especially 
in a territorial system.  In a territorial system, as capital leaves the residence, 
productivity declines because of the decline in tax revenues.  The decline in 
productivity makes the residence still less attractive to capital, meaning that 
still more capital can be expected to depart.  This “rats from a sinking ship” 
phenomenon continues until the increased scarcity of capital relative to other 
factors of production in the residence counterbalances any additional reduction 
in the rate of return to capital resulting from reductions in tax revenues.  The 
point at which equilibrium is reached, however, is likely to be one at which 
productivity is markedly lower than it would have been if tax revenues were 
kept at a level sufficient to maintain capital productivity in the residence.  
Whether there is an overall reduction in productivity – that is, a worldwide 
reduction – depends upon the consequences in the source.  It seems safe to say, 
however, that residence reductions in productivity are less likely in a system of 
worldwide taxation, as high-tax resident jurisdictions retain some tax revenue 
after the departure of capital to lower-tax jurisdictions.  Where the revenue 
retained is sufficient to maintain productivity levels (as it may be given the 
reduced burden to finance tax amenities resulting from the net departure of 
capital), no hollowing out occurs. 
IV. Allocative, Distributional and Competitive Effects 
Part II laid out the case against the traditional understanding of 
international tax neutrality, arguing that the effects of capital flows on pre-tax 
rates of return render the idea that there exists a worldwide baseline against 
which one can measure return problematic.  Part III developed a model for 
thinking about cross-border taxation that takes account of the relationship 
between tax revenues and the pre-tax rate of return – the effect of so-called tax 
amenities on productivity.  Part III also detailed some of the productivity 
consequences of capital flows for home and host jurisdictions, assuming that 
capital moves in response to taxes. 
This Part briefly examines the circumstances under which such capital 
flows are likely to occur in light of the model and compares predictions of the 
model with observation.  It also surveys the likely allocative, distributional and 
competitive properties of international tax systems under the model.  If the case 
for pursuing some global form of neutrality fails, these effects loom larger. 
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A. After-Tax Returns 
A range of average effective tax rates and levels of development 
obtains in the actual world,125 but in broad brush the world consists mostly of a 
set of industrialized, developed countries and a set of relatively non-
industrialized, undeveloped countries.126  Here I consider the situations of a 
developed and an undeveloped country under alternative worldwide tax 
regimes as the world moves from closed to open economies, taking into 
account that under any system, investors generally seek to maximize their after-
tax returns. 
In general, after-tax investment return is given by: 
qi = (1 – ti)*ri, (2) 
where qi is after-tax rate of return, ti is tax rate (expressed as a decimal), and ri 
is pre-tax rate of return (also expressed as a decimal), all in Country i.  In 
making investment decisions, investors seek a combination of tax rate and rate 
of return that provides the maximum value for q. 
Many factors are responsible for ri, but for present purposes I bracket 
all those except taxes and population, which Part II suggests are highly 
correlated with productivity.  Using Equation (1’), it is possible to derive an 
expression for ri in terms of ti and population for a world in which all taxes are 
income taxes levied at a flat rate.  Recall that Equation (1’) relates pre-tax rate 
of return (expressed as the ratio of GDP per capita to that of the U.S. in 1980) 
to tax rate and country population (also as fractions of the respective U.S. 
values for 1980) as follows: 
GDPi = logn(Ti + 1.2899)*logn(Pi + 2.9285). (1’) 
Taking population as fixed for any particular Country i, the second logarithm 
term becomes a constant and for that country (1’) simplifies to: 
GDPi = Ai*logn(Ti + 1.2899), (1’’) 
where Ai is the constant derived by applying the logarithm function to the 
argument of the second logarithm term in Equation (1’), taking as Pi the ratio 
of Country i population to U.S. population in 1980. 
                                                
125 See Heritage Foundation 2011 Index of World Economic Freedom for a list 




If GDP per capita is taken as a proxy for pre-tax rate of return, then one 
can rewrite ri as the product of GDPi and some constant, K.  However, it is not 
necessary to derive this constant if one expresses the after-tax rate of return not 
directly as a rate but as the ratio of the Country i GDP per capita to the same 
reference GDP per capita that was used in Equation (1), U.S. GDP per capita in 
1980, multiplied by one minus the tax rate in Country i.  (Under this procedure, 
the K term appears in both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio.) 
Therefore, let Qi be the ratio of qi to qUS-80, U.S. GDP per capita in 
1980.  Then: 
Qi = (1 – ti)*Ri, (2’) 
where Ri is simply Country i productivity measured against 1980 U.S. 
productivity, or the expression given on the right side of Equation (1’).  For a 
fixed population in Country i, that expression is given by Equation (1’’), so 
that: 
Ri = Ai*logn(Ti + 1.2899). (1’’’) 
Since Ti is just the ratio of ti to the reference tax rate, U.S. amenity taxes in 
1980 (expressed as the ratio of all U.S. tax revenue to U.S. GDP for the year), 
or 0.206, Equation (1’’’) can be rewritten as: 
Ri = Ai*logn((ti/0.206) + 1.2899), (1’’’’) 
and Equation (2’) becomes: 
Qi = (1 – ti)*Ai*logn((ti/0.206) + 1.2899). (2’’) 
Equation (2’’) relates the after-tax return in Country i to its average 
amenity tax rate and population, which latter it treats as fixed.  For any 
population size, after-tax return reaches a maximum at a value for ti of 
approximately 0.34, or 34 percent,127 though what this maximum value is 
depends slightly upon population.128  Table 2 provides figures for a country 
having one-quarter the population of the United States in 1980.  For such a 
country, A is 1.156, and at t = .34, Qi has a value of 0.633.  In other words, the 
after-tax maximum rate of return in Country i, assuming it is one-fourth the 
                                                
127 The derivative of Equation (2’’) with respect to ti is: 
dQi/dti = (1 - ti)*(Ai*4.854/(4.854*ti + 1.2899)) – Ai*logn(4.854*ti + 1.2899), 
which reaches a value of zero when ti is approximately 0.340.  The second-order 
derivative is negative at this value of ti. 
128 Note that Equation (1’) is much less sensitive to variations in population 
size than tax rate. 
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size of the U.S. in 1980 population, is approximately 82.3 percent of the pre-
tax rate of return in the U.S. in 1980, which translates into approximately 103.7 
percent of the after-tax rate of return in the U.S. in 1980.129  Table 2 shows that 
the “sweet spot” for maximum after-tax returns runs from tax rates of about 30 
percent to about 40 percent, which reflects average tax rates (expressed as the 
ratio of total tax revenues to GDP) in developed countries, not developing 
countries.130 
Equation (2’’) suggests, contrary to the usual assumptions about the 
effects of tax rates on investment, that as trade restrictions are lifted, capital is 
more likely to flow into high-tax jurisdictions than into low-tax ones.  The 
evidence is consistent with this hypothesis.131  The vast majority of 
international trade takes place among developed countries.132  Alfaro et al. 
(Alfaro), summarizing data from the IMF and other sources, report that for a 
sample consisting of 23 developed and 75 undeveloped countries over the 
period 1971 to 2000, capital inflows per capita to developed countries exceeded 
those to undeveloped countries by a factor of approximately five.133 
Table 2: Selected predicted after-tax rates of return for a country having 
25 percent of U.S. population (1980) 
Tax rate 
(fraction) 
After-tax return as 
fraction of 1980 U.S. pre-
tax return 
After-tax return as fraction of 
1980 U.S. after-tax return 
0.1 0.597364416 75.23481315 
0.2 0.754596793 95.03737951 
0.3 0.817721901 102.9876450 
0.4 0.813837148 102.4983814 
0.5 0.759112991 95.60617013 
0.6 0.664065935 83.63550823 
0.7 0.535971298 67.50268242 
0.8 0.380102232 47.87181768 
                                                
129 Fraction of U.S. after-tax return in 1980 is given by the ratio to the pre-tax 
return, divided by one minus the 1980 U.S. tax rate (expressed as a fraction), or 0.264.  
Data from OECD. 
130 [CITE.] 
131 Alfaro, at __. 
132 IMF, __. 
133 Alfaro, at 352. 
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0.9 0.200422488 25.24212698 
The bias in favor of capital movements among developed countries 
does not imply, of course, that there will be no capital flows from developed to 
undeveloped countries; it implies only that those flows will be dwarfed by 
flows among developed countries, as indeed they are.  In general, the quantity 
of capital inflows into developing countries appears to have grown steadily 
over the last fifty years.134  In Alfaro’s sample, from 1970 to 1974, net inflows 
per capita to developing countries were less than $1,000 per year; in the five-
year period from 1990 to 1994 they had risen to approximately $2,500 per year; 
and by 1995 they had more than doubled again, to more than $5,000 per 
year.135  Flows per capita into developed countries in Alfaro’s sample grew 
more quickly still, moving from approximately $1,000 per year in 1975-79 to 
more than $25,000 per year from 1995 to 2000.136 
B. Comparisons of Systemic Effects 
1. Territorial Systems 
Even in a territorial system, investors will not automatically invest in 
low-tax jurisdictions once borders are lifted, for the reason just discussed that 
low taxes are highly correlated with lower productivity and lower after-tax 
returns, and investors seek the highest after-tax return, not the lowest tax 
rate.137  The relationship between tax rate and population on one hand and 
productivity rates on the other illuminates the choices that countries face as 
borders become more open.  In a world of territorial tax systems, the opening 
of borders would not be expected to result in massive net capital flows either in 
or out of a developed country, as most trading will occur with similarly situated 
partners and tax advantages of low-tax jurisdictions would seem to be 
swamped by productive weakness.  Rather, the uneven distribution of 
resources, capabilities and factors of production worldwide (commonly 
referred to as “comparative advantage”138) means that supra-normal returns 
become available in all countries as borders are opened or, stated otherwise, 
that new opportunities for gains from trade are as likely to appear in one 




137 See Part III. 
138 Paul A. Samuelson, Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Articles of 
Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 135 
(2004). 
 53 
country as in another.139  The opportunities that emerge in developed countries, 
however, are more likely to be attractive than those emerging in developing 
countries (because of the higher productivity baseline).  For a developed 
country, then, the optimal tax policy would be simply to ensure that neither 
double taxation nor opportunities for substantial tax avoidance materialize for 
investors.  In the case of trade between developed countries, a territorial system 
ought not produce tax consequences much different from a worldwide system, 
as investments should, on balance, be as likely to flow in as out, and, since 
rates across developed jurisdictions are likely to be similar, forgone tax revenue 
(on outbound investment) should approximately equal new tax revenue on 
inbound investment.140 
For a developing country, the situation is dramatically different.  
Developing countries will have trouble attracting capital, since productivity 
rates tend to be much lower.  Lower productivity rates lead foreign investors to 
discount investment opportunities offering supra-marginal returns (discount, 
that is, relative to the value that host-country investors place on those 
opportunities as compared with other opportunities in the host).  In a system of 
worldwide territorial taxation, developing countries have two ways to deal with 
the resulting disincentive to inbound investment.  They can increase taxes in 
order to develop infrastructure and improve the pre-tax rate of return, or they 
can cut taxes to reduce the after-tax cost of investment more directly.  Table 2 
demonstrates why the former method ought to be vastly preferable.  Over the 
range of average tax rates running from ten percent to 30 percent, a one-percent 
increase in average tax rates (measured as a fraction of GDP) is associated with 
approximately a 0.75 percent increase, on average, in after-tax return. 
The difficulty with raising rates to improve infrastructure, of course, is 
that it is a long-term solution to the problem of low productivity.  Higher rates 
do not directly translate to higher productivity but promote it when 
governments make effective use of tax revenues to build infrastructure – a 
                                                
139 See, e.g., id., for an analysis of comparative advantage in the international 
setting.  Samuelson notes that the comparative advantage story may be too rosy in 
some settings, but he does not question the basic theory.  See also Hines & Desai, at __. 
140 See, e.g., Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless Income, at __ (noting that taxes 
should have a minimal impact on choices between domestic and cross-border 
investment where rates are comparable and opportunities for earnings stripping and 
other tax avoidance strategies are unavailable). 
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time-consuming process.141  Where net capital exporters adopt territorial 
systems, developing countries do not have the luxury of attracting capital by 
improving infrastructure with the aid of higher rates, because countries must 
compete on tax rate to attract capital.  Lower tax rates offer investors the 
opportunity for an immediately improved rate of return, a more attractive 
option than the prospect of greater productivity commencing at some point in 
the distant future (often beyond the projected time-horizon of a contemplated 
investment).  The result is a prisoner’s dilemma among underdeveloped 
countries:  The option of competing on tax rates means that developing 
countries cannot compete on tax amenities, because investors will move their 
capital immediately to low-tax jurisdictions.  From the perspective of an 
individual developing country that seeks to attract foreign capital, tax 
competition becomes the only rational strategy, but it leaves developing 
countries as a group worse off than if all could cooperate to increase rates.142  
Instead of improved infrastructure leading to greater capital investment (and 
still more improved infrastructure as taxes per capita rise), the result is 
stagnating levels of development in countries that lacked adequate 
infrastructure in the first place, as under-financed tax amenities continue to go 
under-financed – another widely observed phenomenon.143 
The overall picture that emerges is not pretty.  On one hand, developed 
countries as a group can expect to experience enhanced growth compared to the 
closed-economy world they leave behind as borders become more open and 
group members reap gains from trade.  On the other hand, developing countries 
that participate in the sweepstakes to attract foreign capital are likely to be 
mostly unsuccessful and to remain relatively infrastructure-poor to the extent 
they rely on international trade to fund growth.  Because seeking foreign 
capital means keeping tax rates low or lowering them compared with the rates 
they adopted in the system of closed economies, they do in fact increase 
reliance on foreign investment to fund growth.  The result is that these 
countries all become less able to fund infrastructure from native economic 
                                                
141 See Alfaro, at 353-54, for a statement of the point as it relates to 
institutional quality (noting that the explanatory variables of institutional quality “are 
slowly changing over time.”). 
142 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an extended discussion of 
the prisoner’s dilemma, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-
dilemma/. 
143 See, e.g., Eugene B. Gallagher, Sociological Studies of Third World Health 
and Health Care: Introduction, 30 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAVIOR 345, 345 (1989) 
(“[The ‘Third World’] is a world characterized economic underdevelopment.”). 
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activity and, consequently, more dependent on the vagaries of worldwide 
patterns of investment and trade to fund tax amenities.  In some cases – the 
most likely candidates would seem to be developing countries that begin with 
relatively high tax revenues and GDPs per capita and then seek to attract 
additional capital by lowering rates – tax competition will prove ruinous and 
economic collapse will follow. 
Again, these predictions are largely borne out by the facts.  As 
contrasted with growth in OECD countries, growth in developing countries 
tends to be sporadic, volatile and marked by periods of contraction.144  Over the 
long run, it is only about half as large as growth in developed countries.145  The 
lesson for developing economies in a world of tax competition would seem to 
be that it is better to stay out of the tax-driven competition to attract capital 
entirely and rely instead on domestic production and, perhaps, other sources of 
capital (such as foreign aid) to develop infrastructure. 
2. Worldwide Systems 
A universal worldwide system with a limited foreign tax credit differs 
from a territorial system most significantly in that tax rate competition over 
capital is largely eliminated.  As economies become open, investors continue to 
have the choice to invest in low- or high-tax jurisdictions, but investors in 
capital exporting nations, who typically face high domestic rates, will derive no 
tax advantage from investment in low-tax jurisdictions because of the residual 
home-country tax liability on low-taxed foreign earnings. 
This point is well understood;146 it is simply a feature of worldwide 
systems.  What has not been as appreciated is the generally salutary 
relationship between the absence of tax competition and developing country 
productivity.  Developing countries compete for capital by offering the best 
after-tax return to foreign investors.  In a territorial world, they theoretically 
can compete by improving the pre-tax rate of return or by lowering the actual 
tax rate.  For the reasons explored in the last section, the former is superior 
over the long run, but as a practical matter only the latter is available, leading 
to a cycle of under-taxation and chronic underdevelopment among countries 
that enter the worldwide system with developing rather than developed 
economies.  By contrast, in a worldwide system, residual taxation by the home 
                                                
144 Lant Pritchett, Understanding Patterns of Economic Growth: Searching for 
Hills Among Plateaus, Mountains, and Plains, 14 THE WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 221, 
222 (2000). 
145 Id., at 225. 
146 See, e.g., Kleinbard, Stateless Income; Rosenzweig. 
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country makes direct competition on rates impossible.  Consequently, if states 
compete for foreign capital, they can be expected to do so by competing to 
provide better tax amenities, that is, by raising rates and improving 
infrastructure. 
The residual character of an FTC system makes competition to provide 
tax amenities particularly attractive to developing countries, because it 
empowers home-country investors to finance the host-country fisc at the 
expense of the home fisc, rather than of the investors themselves.  That is, 
because home-country residents are reimbursed by the home-country 
government via the FTC, foreign taxes paid by home residents constitute a 
wealth transfer from home country to host country where the party in control of 
the amount of the transfer does not bear its cost.  Consequently, host countries 
have access to a source of funding that is to some extent free.  In practice, both 
nondiscrimination rules147 and limits on residence jurisdictions’ FTC largess148 
prevent source rates on foreign investors from going too high, but these limits 
merely blunt the effect; they do not eliminate it, especially since host 
jurisdictions can return some of the benefits of high rates on their own residents 
in the form of tax benefits or even direct transfer payments. 
From a worldwide welfare perspective, it is hard to see how this 
incentive structure does not improve things, despite the apparent departure 
from “neutrality” – namely, tax-induced changes on the pre-tax rate of return in 
each jurisdiction.  On one hand, as investment moves among jurisdictions 
having comparable tax rates, tax revenues should generally rise uniformly 
because of rising productivity or the reciprocal exploitation of comparative 
advantage.  And, on the other, as investment that moves from developed to 
developing countries the siphoning of tax revenues to developing countries 
improves rates of productivity there and may or may not damage productivity 
in the home jurisdiction.  (Recall that the effect on home country productivity 
is ambiguous when both capital and some of the associated tax revenue leave 
the jurisdiction, since some of the tax amenities that the departing revenue 
finances were needed only to pay for amenities for the capital that has now 
left.)  Indeed, even if developing countries respond to the opening of borders 
                                                
147 See, e.g., Art. I-4 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
(establishing the “four freedoms,” which, together, have been applied by the European 
Court of Justice to prevent member states of the EU from engaging in income tax 
discrimination).  See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax 
Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 
1186, 1194 (2006). 
148 [CITE to U.S. limits on creditability.] 
 57 
by raising their rates to the levels in developed countries, so that all tax revenue 
associated with exported capital goes to the developing country, worldwide 
productivity should increase, since the benefit from a marginal dollar of tax 
revenue in a low-tax jurisdiction will exceed the detriment from the loss of that 
dollar of revenue in the high-tax jurisdiction.149 
3. Mixed Systems 
The world in fact is populated mostly by jurisdictions that employ 
some version of territoriality and a handful of jurisdictions that employ some 
variant of worldwide taxation – the U.S. being the most prominent example.150  
A world of mixed regimes can change the calculation for any individual 
jurisdiction about which system it should adopt.  For example, as discussed 
earlier, a proponent of CON should be indifferent between a world of 
worldwide taxation and one of territorial taxation, because the relative prices of 
all investments will be the same for all residents in every jurisdiction in either 
world.151  However, the competitive or neutrality properties of pursuing a 
worldwide regime will not necessarily be preserved if other countries are 
territorial, or vice-versa.152  Also as previously discussed,153 under the standard 
mode of neutrality analysis, residents of high-tax worldwide jurisdictions are at 
both an ownership neutrality and a competitive disadvantage when compared 
with residents of territorial jurisdictions.  Further, if the most important 
comparative advantage stemming from international trade derives from the 
opportunity to allocate ownership to non-residents, the efficiency losses from 
tax-induced ownership changes (or non-changes) for residents of high-tax 
worldwide jurisdictions are likely to be quite high given the ease with which 
ownership can be transferred from one person to another.154 
Most of these worries would appear to be overstated if the theory 
offered here is accurate.  The worry on competitive neutrality is that residents 
of high-tax worldwide systems will be unable to compete with investors in 
                                                
149 This result follows from the logarithmic property of Equation (1). 
150 Kleinbard, Stateless Income, at __.  In light of opportunities for deferral 
and the use of disregarded entities, the U.S. system is more accurately characterized as 
worldwide lite or even quasi-territorial than as a true territorial system.  Kleinbard, 
Lessons of Stateless Income, at __. 
151 Hines, Reconsidering, at __. 
152 [CITES.] 
153 Part I.B.3. 
154 Hines, Reconsidering, at __. 
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territorial jurisdictions for favorable investment opportunities in low-tax 
jurisdictions.155  Tax competition among low-tax jurisdictions to attract foreign 
capital then will exacerbate the problem.  The story rests on the view, 
implicitly ratified under the traditional mode of neutrality analysis, that 
advantageous investment opportunities in low-tax jurisdictions are likely to be 
prevalent as borders open because of the reduced tax burden.  Under the tax 
amenity theory, this worry would seem to be overstated because low-tax 
jurisdictions are unlikely to offer many favorable investment opportunities for 
the same reason – the reduced tax burden.  And, as reported earlier in this Part, 
the evidence seems to support the theory.  Capital moving across borders 
overwhelmingly flows into high-tax jurisdictions, not low-tax ones. 
The story is similar even if the dominant margin along which investors 
respond to cross-border tax incentives is ownership identity.  Nothing about the 
CON story suggests that if ownership identity in fact is more tax-elastic and of 
greater import than the capital location or savings margins, favorable 
investment opportunities are more likely to arise in low-tax jurisdictions.  
Productivity still seems to require substantial infrastructure, a point that Desai 
and Hines themselves suggest: 
[M]odern scholars view [foreign direct investment, or FDI] as arising 
from differential capabilities, and consequently differential 
productivity, among firms, and the extension of intangible assets across 
borders.  This intuition squares well with empirical FDI patterns, which 
include the fact that most of the world’s FDI represents investment 
from one high-income country into another, and the fact that a very 
high fraction of such investment takes the form of acquiring existing 
businesses.156 
Desai and Hines frame their observation in terms of the movement of 
investment among high-income rather than high-tax jurisdictions, but the 
correlation between incomes and taxation is, as noted previously, itself quite 
high.  Apart from tax havens, there are not many high-income jurisdictions that 
do not have high taxes.157 
Conclusion 
Taking their cue from the theory of neutrality as developed in the 
domestic setting, the traditional modes of analyzing international tax neutrality 
                                                
155 Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless Income, at __. 
156 Desai & Hines, at 956. 
157 [CITE.] 
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downplay or disregard the link between tax revenues and productivity.  In the 
domestic setting, one need not subscribe to the view that there exists a natural 
productivity level, or pre-tax rate of return, in order to be justified in that 
enterprise, because the object of neutrality analysis is to ascertain the extent to 
which various possible tax rules alter the relative prices of goods in ways that 
create deadweight loss.  No assumption need be made of the unavailability of 
tax revenues, which, after all, are necessary in some measure to make 
significant rates of return possible, in order to make the inquiry.  Rather, what 
is required is an assumption that tax revenues theoretically could be supplied 
on some basis that does not affect, and is not affected by, relative prices. 
That assumption is possible in the domestic setting, but it is not 
available even as a theoretical ideal in the international setting, where tax rules 
inevitably affect both the magnitude of tax revenues and the identities of their 
recipients.  In the domestic setting, the idea of a productivity level or pre-tax 
rate of return is implicitly built into the decision about the level of tax 
amenities to be supplied, or the revenue target.  In the international setting, the 
only way to make sense of the pre-tax rate of return is to suppose that states 
begin from a world of closed economies and then move to more open ones.  
But tax incentives that arise as that movement takes place redirect tax revenues, 
causing the revenue raised to diverge from the target and thereby to affect the 
supply of tax amenities.  Over time, as tax amenities exceed or fall short of the 
original target, the pre-tax rate of return that was supposed to be taken as the 
baseline against which to measure the distorting effects of tax rules is adjusted.  
As a result, what appeared to be a baseline turns out to be no baseline at all.  In 
a final twist, the alterations themselves may well be productivity and even 
efficiency-enhancing, even though they are “tax-motivated.”  Where, for 
example, tax rules encourage low-productivity, low-tax source jurisdictions to 
compete on the supply of tax amenities (rather than on tax rate), the net effect 
over time would seem to be a slight lowering of productivity in high-tax 
residence jurisdictions and a much larger increase in the productivity of the 
sources.  On a worldwide basis, that would count as tax-motivated capital shifts 
leading to arrangements that are welfare-enhancing, not welfare-reducing. 
One inference that may be drawn is that a more fruitful lens than 
neutrality through which to view the effects of international tax rules is the 
competitive, allocative and distributional properties of various possible tax 
regimes.  From a global welfare perspective, the object of designing a tax 
regime is not to maximize neutrality but to promote overall welfare, which may 
require promoting tax “distortions” that improve total productivity. 
A second inference is that sensitivity to the relationship between tax 
revenue and productivity suggests that the consequences of adopting various 
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possible methods of double tax relief are likely to be quite different from those 
assumed under the traditional view.  In particular, worldwide regimes are more 
likely than territorial regimes to promote welfare-enhancing improvements to 
infrastructure in low-tax jurisdictions, while the competitive and savings 




Data for the regression on Equation 1: 
p1 is country population 1980 as fraction U.S. 1980 
p2 is country tax revenue 1980 as percentage U.S. tax revenue 1980, backing 
out all social security contributions 
 
Y = ln(p1+x1)*ln(p2 + x2) 
Country x1 x2 Y yc Y-yc SEest YcLo YcHi 
Australia 0.0643 0.9621 0.8350 0.8899 -0.0549 0.0363 0.8145 0.9654 
Austria 0.0332 1.1771 0.9191 0.9805 -0.0614 0.0430 0.8911 1.0699 
Belgium 0.0433 1.1685 0.8925 0.9797 -0.0872 0.0425 0.8914 1.0681 
Canada 0.1082 0.9807 0.9591 0.9109 0.0482 0.0361 0.8359 0.9859 
Denmark 0.0225 1.7977 1.2836 1.2200 0.0636 0.0618 1.0915 1.3486 
Finland 0.0210 0.8249 0.8514 0.8101 0.0413 0.0336 0.7402 0.8800 
France 0.2425 0.8207 0.9032 0.8620 0.0412 0.0318 0.7960 0.9281 
Germany 0.2713 1.0417 0.9105 0.9847 -0.0742 0.0351 0.9116 1.0577 
Greece 0.0416 0.0444 0.5374 0.3139 0.2235 0.0540 0.2016 0.4263 
Ireland 0.0150 0.4406 0.6190 0.5920 0.0270 0.0324 0.5247 0.6594 
Italy 0.2484 0.2869 0.7960 0.5264 0.2696 0.0421 0.4388 0.6139 
Japan 0.5141 0.5188 0.7947 0.7326 0.0621 0.0365 0.6568 0.8084 
Korea 0.1678 0.0888 0.1685 0.3629 -0.1944 0.0535 0.2518 0.4741 
Mexico 0.3008 0.1332 0.2382 0.4136 -0.1754 0.0531 0.3033 0.5240 
Netherlands 0.0622 1.3235 0.9602 1.0524 -0.0922 0.0467 0.9553 1.1496 
New 
Zealand 
0.0140 0.7253 0.6463 0.7562 -0.1099 0.0319 0.6899 0.8225 
Norway 0.0180 1.6240 1.4941 1.1557 0.3384 0.0569 1.0373 1.2741 
Portugal 0.0430 0.0560 0.3748 0.3235 0.0513 0.0531 0.2131 0.4339 
Spain 0.1650 0.1302 0.5679 0.3961 0.1718 0.0502 0.2916 0.5005 
Sweden 0.0366 1.6330 0.9717 1.1658 -0.1941 0.0567 1.0480 1.2836 
Turkey 0.1983 0.0564 0.1021 0.3390 -0.2369 0.0568 0.2208 0.4571 
United 
Kingdom 
0.2478 0.8674 0.8299 0.8886 -0.0587 0.0323 0.8214 0.9558 
United 
States 
1.0000 0.7810 1.0000 0.9961 0.0039 0.0345 0.9243 1.0678 
 
Corr. Coeff. =  0.893230; r*r =  0.797861 
RMS Error =  0.152746; d.f = 21; SSq =  0.489961 




p1= 2.928549 +/-  0.216125; p= 0.0000 
p2= 1.289874 +/-  0.084655; p= 0.0000 
 
Covariance Matrix Terms and Error-Correlations... 
B(1,1)= 0.0467100944052148; r= 1.0000 
B(1,2)=B(2,1)= -0.014457683649219772; r=-0.7902 
B(2,2)= 0.0071664996260828034; r= 1.0000 
